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ON THE HISTORICAL UNDERSTANDING OF KIERKEGAARD*

By Karl Löwith

Visiting Professor in Philosophy, The Hartford Theological Seminary

I

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

In the following pages Kierkegaard's theses are to be discussed only from a limited point of view. The proper historical setting and function of his decisive category of the single "individual"[1] will be analyzed. The literature on Kierkegaard has, thus far, paid little or no attention to this question, because commentators stood so heavily under the spell of Kierkegaard's "existential" claim that they failed to recognize the actual circumstances which evoked Kierkegaard's radically Protestant subjectivism. If Kierkegaard was interpreted at all in a historical setting, the only topics explored were his relations to Danish literature and theology, his attitude towards Hegelianism, and a comparison with Nietzsche.[2] That Kierkegaard's real contemporary and antipode was none other than Marx went just as unnoticed as the fact that, as pupil and opponent of Hegel, he was essentially in sympathy with the thinking of L. Feuerbach, whose criticism of Christianity sprang directly from Hegel's ambiguous *Aufhebung* (i.e., simultaneous cancellation and conservation) of religion into the freedom of thought, and ultimately from Luther's protest and doctrine of justification. For Luther's Christian protest against the Papal authority caused not only a universal emancipation but also a final revolt against Christianity as such, culminating in Nietzsche's *Antichrist*. The extent to which the German development from Luther to Nietzsche[3] includes Kierkegaard also can only briefly be described here.

It cannot be disputed that Kierkegaard's passionate attack upon the

* For a more elaborate analysis see my book, *Von Hegel bis Nietzsche* (Zürich and New York, 1941).

1. See *The Point of View* (London, New York, 1939), pp. 111-40, the two notes on "The Individual."

2. Cf. K. Löwith, *Kierkegaard und Nietzsche* (Frankfurt am Main, 1933); K. Jaspers, *Vernunft und Existenz* (Groningen, Batavia, 1935): A. Baeumler, *Studien zur deutschen Geistesgeschichte* (Berlin, 1937).

3. Cf. J. E. Spenlé, *La Pensée allemande de Luther à Nietzsche* (Paris, 1934).

mediocre Christianity of a Christendom grown worldly, as he called the official state of affairs, once more made clear what *imitatio Christi* means in earnest. Kierkegaard showed the contradiction between the demands on the part of Christianity and of the world in which we live. This contradiction, however, has been felt also by those who aimed not at a restoration, but at the abolishment of Christianity. Feuerbach and Nietzsche agree with Kierkegaard that Christianity is practically denied even by those who cling to it nominally, because all the institutions and standards of modern men are directly opposed to original Christianity. Kierkegaard, who stands out in contrast to Feuerbach and Nietzsche by the Christian purpose of his criticism, contributed nevertheless to the destruction of the Christian tradition by means of his radicalism. He saw in the integration of Christianity into the process of history—in contradistinction to Hegel who incorporated it in that very process—a lie of eighteen hundred years which has to be eliminated by a direct self-appropriation of Christianity, as contrasted with its historical expansion, tradition, and secularization. For the "world" cannot save true Christianity, which has never been of this world.

Looking at little Denmark as a "perfect model" of the continent he discerned Europe's religious and social dissolution. He opposed it by declaring the single individual, "who just happened to be also the principle of Christianity," to be the only salvation of the age. The single "individual" was designed to make clear "that the author had understood how to express by one single word with absolute finality his understanding of his age and of himself in it." "In these times (1847) policy is everything," thus begins the preface to the note about the single individual, in order to conclude by saying that what the age demands, namely, social reforms and a political revolution, is the contrary of what it needs, namely, something immutable and indisputable. Kierkegaard's "individual" is a response to the general trend of his time and a forceful reaction to public events.

II

KIERKEGAARD AND MARX

In flat contradiction to Marx's propaganda for a world revolution which raises the proletarian masses to the "generic essence" (*Gattungswesen*) of man, Kierkegaard reduced private existence to that of the

solitary individual and contrasted the outwardness of the mass-man with the inwardness of selfhood. The two unique prototypes of a truly individualized existence are, for him, Socrates in the Athenian polis and Christ over against the whole world of Jews and Gentiles. Every form of association seemed to Kierkegaard a means of leveling.

> It is quite impossible for the community or the idea of association to save our age. On the contrary, association is the scepticism which is necessary in order that the development of individuality may proceed uniformly, so that the individual will either be lost or, disciplined by such abstractions, will find himself religiously. Nowadays the principle of association (which at the most is only valid where material interests are concerned) is not positive but negative; it is an escape, a distraction and an illusion. Dialectically the position is this: the principle of association by strengthening the individual, enervates him; it strengthens numerically, but ethically that is a weakening.[4]

The same is true of association in Christendom. Kierkegaard's individual is a "corrective" or antidote against social democratic "mankind," against liberal Christendom, and, as regards philosophy, against the Hegelian generality in thinking. The universal "system"—be it that of the spirit (Hegel) or of mankind (Marx)—absorbed in world-historical speculation has forgotten what it means to be a human being—not to be man in general, but to be I, thou, and he, each for himself.

Shortly before the revolution of 1848 Marx and Kierkegaard reached a decision: Marx in the Communist Manifesto (1847), and Kierkegaard in a book-review (1846) a part of which is *The Present Age*. The former concludes: "Proletarians of all countries, unite!" while the latter maintains that each one ought to work for his own salvation, while the socialist prophecy concerning the progress of the world is allowable only as a joke. But from the historical point of view this antithesis represents merely two different sides of a common destruction: for the sake of revolutionizing the bourgeois-*capitalistic* world Marx relies on the proletarian mass, while Kierkegaard in his struggle against the bourgeois-*Christian* world stakes everything on the individual. Marx saw in bourgeois society only so many "isolated individuals" alienated from their generic essence, while Kierkegaard condemned Christendom as a widely spread organization in which nobody is a follower of Christ. Both deal with estrangements of man from himself. Marx considers

4. *The Present Age* (London, New York, 1940), pp. 61 ff.

that self-alienation which capitalism is to man, and Kierkegaard that which Christendom is to the Christian. Hegel's reconciliation of state, church, and bourgeois society gives way to the religious restoration of Kierkegaard and to the social revolution of Marx.

Marx characterizes the epoch of bourgeois society as one of passions without truth and of truths without passion. Its world of perfect matter-of-factness can endure itself only by borrowing. Its development is a continuous repetition of the same strain and relaxation; its contradictions push themselves to extreme only to become blunted and fused; its history is without events and its heroes without deeds. Its supreme law is irresolution. In nearly the same terms Kierkegaard describes the present age as being without passion and decision, as an age of leveling which he opposes by stressing the distinction of levels. As specific forms of this leveling process he analyzes the leveling of the distinction between talk and silence in irresponsible chatter; between private and public spheres in semiprivate news; between form and matter in empty shapelessness; between reserve and openness in conventional representation; between love and lust in passionless flirtation; between objective knowledge and subjective conviction in irresponsible argumentation. Marx sets against the bankruptcy of this world the proletarian mass; Kierkegaard, the individual existence in its singleness before God. Economic unrest seems to him only of symptomatic importance: "It shows that the European constitution has changed entirely; in the future we shall have internal troubles—*secessio in montem sacrum.*" More decisive than the economic, social, and political bankruptcy faced by Europe is the spiritual decay caused by the devastating work of the press.[5] "We had best silence the ring of time for one hour; but as we sha'n't succeed in it presumably, I would like to call out to my contemporaries: economy, drastic economy!" That is to say: get back to the elementary question of human existence, to the bare question of existence as such, which was to Kierkegaard the inner counterpart of what Marx called the "full-sized earthly question." So-called "existence" is to both no longer what it was to Hegel, namely the simple "ex-istere" as the emergence of the inner essence into appropriate existence. In repudiating Hegel's reasonable world they separate again what Hegel had united. Marx decides in favor of a humanitarian

5. Cf. D. F. Swenson, *Something about Kierkegaard* (Minneapolis, 1941), pp. 147 ff.

world, and Kierkegaard in favor of an unworldly Christianity that is indifferent to secular pretensions. "Once the objection to Christianity was misanthropy, and now Christianity is—humanity! Once Christianity was to the Jews a scandal and to the Greeks foolishness, and now it is—civilization!"

It becomes clear from a thorough study of the cultural life of the eighteen-forties, that Marx's economic analysis and Kierkegaard's psychology together form a single antithesis to Hegel. They conceive "what is" respectively as a world determined by goods and money and as an existence pervaded by irony and boredom. The "realm of spirits" in Hegel's philosophy becomes a ghost in both the world of labor and that of despair. Hegel's "Idea being in itself" is changed into a "German ideology," and the "Self-enjoyment of the Absolute Spirit" into a "Sickness unto Death." Hegel's consummation of history becomes for both the end of an epoch, to be followed by an extensive revolution according to Marx, and by an intensive reformation according to Kierkegaard. Hegel's concrete mediations turn into abstract decisions which Kierkegaard makes in favor of the old Christian God, and Marx in favor of a new earthly world.

III

KIERKEGAARD'S ATTACK UPON OFFICIAL CHRISTENDOM

In the pamphlets bearing the title, *The Instant*,—because it was here and now that the question "Christianity or worldliness" was to be decided—Kierkegaard drew the final conclusions, protesting with utmost irony against the "Protestant mediocrity" of State-Christians who mediate between the world and Christ, and at the same time against Hegel's reconciliation of the state with Christianity. In the so-called Christian state the divine is patronized by the human.

Kierkegaard asks, alluding to Hegel: How on earth did such a reasonable being as the state take such an absurdity into its head: the desire for patronizing the divine? Now, this is a long story, but mainly it is connected with the fact that Christianity in the course of time was served less and less according to its true character as the divine. Imagine a statesman at the time of Christianity's first appearance in the world and ask him: *quid tibi videtur*? don't you think that this is a religion for the state? In all probability he would deem you crazy and hardly deserving of a reply. If, however, Christianity is served

in cowardly fear of men, in mediocrity and temporal interest, the matter looks different. Then it may really appear as though Christianity, being thus held in high esteem, ought to be thankful for the protection of the state.[6]

The human cannot patronize the divine, for true Christianity is nothing less than an imitation of Christ which distinctly renounces all worldly things. But the worldly exists for man above all in the form of the state. Consequently *The Instant* is aimed at the admitted lie of a seeming understanding between Christianity and state.

Suppose the state appoints one thousand officers who with their families live on impeding Christianity; it would certainly be an attempt at rendering Christianity, if possible, impossible. And yet such an attempt would not be so dangerous by far as that which actually happens: that the state appoints one thousand officers who as "heralds of Christianity" have a financial interest, first, in that the people call themselves Christians, and secondly, in that this situation remains unchanged, that the people, thus, do not learn what true Christianity is. Yet the activity of this profession does not go on under the name of impeding Christianity, nor do one thousand officers with families get their salaries for that; no, they announce Christianity, they spread Christianity, they work for it. Is not this wellnigh the most dangerous thing that could be thought up for the purpose of rendering Christianity, if possible, impossible?"[7]

This state-church or even national-church Christianity, as represented in Denmark by Bishop Mynster and Pastor Grundtvig, is the contrary of what the New Testament announces as truth. In modern Christendom, Christianity is done away with—through spreading.

Kierkegaard's criticism of modern Christendom is a criticism of Christianity that has become a "positive" or "working" religion, at the expense of the original faith. It is as easy to denounce Kierkegaard as to be under his spell, but it is difficult to understand his ambiguous attitude towards Christianity, one of attacking its present reality by defending its rigorous meaning. He realized that the message of Christianity is not the pronunciamento of the history of the world, since eternity is not temporality, and the cross of the world cannot be absorbed in progress, post-war reconstruction, and welfare.

6. *Gesammelte Werke*, XII (Jena, 1923), pp. 17 ff. (not yet translated); cf. L. Feuerbach, *Sämmtliche Werke*, I (Leipzig, 1846), pp. 98 ff.

7. *Gesammelte Werke*, XII, pp. 5 ff.

IV

KIERKEGAARD'S PARADOXICAL NOTION OF FAITH

Kierkegaard's crucial act of appropriation implies the task of "eliminating the eighteen hundred years [of Christian history] as though they had not been," of becoming inwardly a contemporary of original Christianity. But this is possible only if Christianity, having existed for centuries, is now transposed from a general historical reality into each one's peculiar possibility and, thus, into a kind of postulate.

> In this manner God certainly becomes a postulate, but not in the otiose manner in which this word is commonly understood. It becomes clear rather that the only way in which an existing individual comes into relation with God, is when the dialectical contradiction brings his passion to the point of despair, and helps him to embrace God with the category of despair (faith). Then the postulate is so far from being arbitrary that it is precisely a life-necessity. It is then not so much that God is a postulate as that the existing individual's postulation of God is a necessity.[8]

The literally "absolute," i.e., detached, objective truth of Christianity cannot be seized upon, for the "point of junction" of its absoluteness lies precisely in the absolute attitude towards it. The objective existence of Christianity through eighteen hundred years is, therefore, as an argument pro, in the instant of decision, equal to naught, as a determinant contra, however, something quite excellent. For, if truth lies in individual appropriation, the objective validity of Christianity means only its indifference towards the subject that I am myself.

But how is one to distinguish at all, within such a definition of truth, between madness and truth, since both are capable of showing forth the same "inwardness"? A passionate antichristian would then be no more and no less "true" than a passionate Christian, just as every other pathos of existence would as pathos also have its truth.[9] This dilemma has been noticed by Kierkegaard, but discussed only by way of a footnote. He affirms the thesis by saying that the passionate inwardness of infinity has to be distinguished from the inwardness of mere finiteness. But does inwardness as such really permit a distinction of this kind? The infinity of Christian inwardness is certainly not based entirely on its mere subjectivity, but also on its object, on God's infinity. But then

8. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (Princeton, 1941), p. 179.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 173, 176 ff.

the inwardness of infinity, that is to say passionate God-relationship, can be distinguished from a relationship to something finite (which as passionate relationship would be a mad one) only with a view to God and thus contrarily to one's own, at any rate finite passion. If, however, to exist in passion is really the "ultimate" and the objective that which vanishes, then necessarily the possibility of distinguishing at all between finite and infinite inwardness and, consequently, between madness and truth, also would vanish. As a matter of fact, Kierkegaard drew these conclusions by having truth and inwardness coincide.

> When the question of truth is raised in an objective manner, reflection is directed objectively to the truth as an object to which the knower is related. Reflection is not focussed upon the relationship, however, but upon the question of whether it is the truth to which the knower is related. If only the object to which he is related is the truth, the subject is accounted to be in the truth. When the question of the truth is raised subjectively, reflection is directed subjectively to the nature of the individual's relationship; if only the mode of his relationship is in the truth, the individual is in the truth even if he should happen to be thus related to what is not true.[10]

Whether there is a God remains necessarily insignificant, if the main and only point is that the individual is related "to something" so that his relationship is in truth, i.e., subjectively, a God-relationship. The ultimate that can be reached as to objectivity on this way to truth (where the way itself *is* already the truth) is "objective uncertainty." For whether one's own God-relationship is objectively, i.e., from God's point of view, "true," no one can ascertain by himself. To a person existing in faith the highest truth is just this objective uncertainty in his appropriation. Thus, according to Kierkegaard, someone may pray "in truth" to God although he worships in fact an idol, just as, vice versa, someone may pray "in truth" to an idol although he worships in a Christian church the true Christian God. For truth is the "inward How," not the "outward What." Since, however, Christian subjectivity does not aim at "something," but at true Christianity, and must do so unless truth shall be absurdity, the truth of believing does not exclusively exist in subjective appropriation, but in the fact that this appropriation "holds fast the objective uncertainty" as such. The objectivity of belief is, thus, not in itself, but on account of its repellent

10. *Ibid.*, p. 178.

character, a constituent of the truth of appropriation. Both together convert belief into a paradox.

> When subjectivity, inwardness, is the truth, the truth becomes objectively a paradox; and the fact that the truth is objectively a paradox shows in its turn that subjectivity is the truth. For the objective situation is repellent; and the expression for the objective repulsion constitutes the tension and the measure of the corresponding inwardness.[11]

Subjectivity, thus, is the true way to eternal truth; this, however, is necessarily paradoxical by virtue of its relationship to an existing individual, and only by way of repulsion attractive.

Consistent with the subjectivity of Christian truth is the mode of its communication.

> When I understood this, it also became clear to me that if I desire to communicate anything on this point, it would first of all be necessary to give my exposition an *indirect* form. For if inwardness is the truth, results are only rubbish with which we should not trouble each other. The communication of results is an unnatural form of intercourse between man and man insofar as every man is a spiritual being for whom the truth consists in nothing else than in the selfactivity of personal appropriation which the communication of a result tends to prevent.[12]

Because that which in Christianity is truth is an existing wonder or a paradox—a human being who is at the same time God—this truth can, in its turn, be truthfully communicated only paradoxically, but not directly. It must be communicated so that the other is brought into a proper relationship of appropriation towards the communicated, but not towards the communicating person. The truth of "Christian maieutics" rests on the existing subjectivity; it aims at a truth which is only indirectly communicable because it has to be appropriated spontaneously. The communication becomes reduced to a mere "pointing out" in order to enable everyone as an individual to carry out the appropriation. "To point out the religious, the Christian, without authority, this is the proper category for my work as author, regarded as a whole."[13]

That the indirectness of communication causes the same contradic-

11. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 216 f.; cf. pp. 312 ff.
13. *The Point of View*, p. 155.

tion as the existentialization of a presupposed truth does, Kierkegaard knows well; for which reason he makes the indirect communication finally end in directness, namely in "bearing witness" to the truth.

> The communication of Christianity must ultimately end in bearing witness, the maieutic form can never be final. For truth, from the Christian point of view, does not lie in the subject (as Socrates understood it), but in a revelation which must be proclaimed. In Christendom the maieutic form can certainly be used, simply because the majority in fact live under the impression that they are Christians. But since Christianity is Christianity, the maieuticer must become the witness.[14]

Kierkegaard did not come forward as witness, although it was his keenest desire to be permitted to be slain for the truth, an "apostle's" not a "genius's" privilege.[15] His own Christian category, therefore, was to be a "religious writer" on the "borderline between a poetical and a religious existence." Consequently he did not mean his religious discourses to be sermons, but Christian discourses in devotional style. His attack upon existing Christendom, however, cannot be understood as resulting from his religious authorship, but as an outburst of his will to bear witness. Provoking a scandal, he denied the representatives of the Danish church the right of passing for witnesses to the truth, without defending, however, the Christian truth with apostolic authority himself. Only in the name of human uprightness and honesty did Kierkegaard present himself.

> For this uprightness I will run the risk. But I do not say that I risk anything for Christianity. Supposing I should literally become a sacrifice, I should then not be a sacrifice for Christianity but only for my desire for uprightness.[16]

V

KIERKEGAARD AND FEUERBACH

Insisting on an uncompromising attitude as such, either in favor or against true Christianity, Kierkegaard was able to sympathize with Feuerbach's attack—"however strange it may seem." He would have sympathized even more with Nietzsche's passionate revolt. Feuerbach

14. *The Journals of Søren Kierkegaard* (London, New York, 1938), entry number 809.
15. *The Present Age*, pp. 77 ff., 137 ff.
16. *Angriff auf die Christenheit* (Stuttgart, 1896), pp. 148 f. (not yet translated).

seemed to him "a bit stupid" in directing his attack, causing only little embarrassment to the official believers. In general, however, says Kierkegaard,

> Such writers as Börne, Heine, Feuerbach etc. have great interest for an experimenter. They are for the most part very thoroughly informed about the religious, i.e., they know definitely that they want to have nothing to do with it. This is a great advantage over the "Systematic" writers (Hegel) who without knowing in what the religious properly consists, undertake to explain it . . . , but always incompetently.[17]

Whereas, from a definitely Antichristian viewpoint, that which is Christianity is no less capable of being known than it is from a definitely Christian viewpoint. To prove this Kierkegaard refers to Pascal and Feuerbach.

> Thus it is that I as an experimenter have understood the religious. . . . That such is the case with suffering as viewed from the religious standpoint, I know from the fact that I can confront two men who say the same identical thing. Feuerbach, who pays homage to the principle of healthy-mindedness says that the religious existence (more particularly the Christian) is a constant history of suffering; he begs us merely to consider Pascal's life, and that is sufficient. Pascal says exactly the same thing: "Suffering is the natural state of the Christian, just as health is that of the natural man."[18]

Stressing the principle even more, Kierkegaard says in the *Journals* that writers like Feuerbach, who are a "last formation of freethinkers" can be quite useful to Christianity; for, strictly speaking, they are defending it against the Christians of today who no longer know that it is not humanity and progress but a world turned upside down. *"Et ab hoste consilium"* closes a reference to Feuerbach's importance for the understanding of Christianity in a world that calls itself Christian and is a negation of Christianity.

The philosopher of this "Christian World" was to both, Feuerbach and Kierkegaard, Hegel.

> Modern speculation seems almost to have done the trick of going *further* than Christianity, *on the other side,* or of understanding that Christianity had gone so far that it had about got back to paganism. For a man to prefer paganism to Christianity is by no means confusing, but to discover paganism as the

17. *Stages on Life's Way* (London, 1940), p. 409.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 415.

highest development within Christianity is to work injustice both to paganism and to Christianity; to Christianity, because it becomes something other then it is, and to paganism, which does not become anything at all, though it really was something.[19]

In the same way, Feuerbach conceived Hegel's metaphysics as the last grandiose attempt at a restoration of bankrupt Christianity through philosophy.

The much-praised, speculative identity of spirit and matter, of the infinite and the finite, of the divine and the human, is nothing but the fatal contradiction of the modern age: the identity of belief and unbelief, religion and atheism, Christianity and paganism at its highest peak, on the summit of metaphysics.[20]

In Hegel this contradiction becomes a bit obscure, because the negation of God is made an objective modification of God. Jesus Christ is conceived in terms of Aristotle.

Despite their common opposition, however, to Hegel's synthesis of Greek and Christian tradition, Kierkegaard's as well as Feuerbach's concept of belief is determined by Hegel's polemics against every "positivity" as a merely external way of being given or posited.[21] From Hegel's idealistic proposition that any religion or ethics confronting man merely objectively, and thus being "positive," is somehow "shocking" as not yet reconciled with the subject and appropriated by him, it is only a single step to Feuerbach's anthropological thesis that all modifications of the Divine Being are mere projections of the human being, and to Kierkegaard's existential thesis that God exists only in and for the subjectivity of one's own God-relationship.

VI

FEUERBACH'S AND KIERKEGAARD'S RELATION TO LUTHER

Hegel's proposition, ultimately originates in Luther. "This comprehension has been called belief. This is no historical (i.e., external-objective) belief. We Lutherans—I am and will remain one—have only that original belief."[22] With such a sensibly comprehending belief that

19. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 323.

20. L. Feuerbach, *Grundsätze der Philosophie der Zukunft* (Zürich, 1843), § 21; cf. Nietzsche, *The Antichrist* (New York, 1920), § 38.

21. Hegel, *Theologische Jugendschriften* (Tübingen, 1907), pp. 137 ff., 276 ff.

22. *Idem., Werke* (Berlin, 1832-87), VIII, p. 89: XVII, pp. 318 ff.

knows that man in his relation to God is destined to freedom, Hegel knew himself to be a Protestant. The "original" belief rests on the freedom of the spirit related to the absolute, a freedom looked upon by Hegel as the perfection of Luther's principle of certitude of belief. To Luther, likewise, Feuerbach and Kierkegaard refer in order to justify respectively their anthropological and existential concepts of belief. To Feuerbach the progressive development of religion consists in the principle that "more and more is denied to God and attributed to himself by man."

> That God that is man, the human God, i.e., Christ, is the only God of Protestantism. Protestantism does not care any longer as Catholicism does for what God is in himself, but only for what he is to man; there is, therefore, no speculative or contemplative tendency in it as in Catholicism, it is no longer theology, it is essentially Christology only, i.e., religious anthropology.[23]

That Feuerbach's humanization of theology along with its atheistic consequences belongs, indeed, to the very bosom of the history of German Protestantism, is clear from the fact that he was able to derive the basic principles of his criticism of religion from Luther. In the thirteenth chapter of *The Essence of Christianity*, which treats of "The Mystery of Faith," he quotes Luther:

> As thou believest of God, so is he to thee. If thou believest it, thou hast it, but if thou believest not, thou hast none of it. Therefore, as we believe, so does it happen to us. If we regard him as our God, he will not be our devil. But if we regard him not as our God, then truly he is not our God (p. 171).

Feuerbach continues with the following interpretation:

> Thus if I believe in a God, I have a God, i.e., faith in God is the God of man. [For] if God is such, whatever it may be, as I believe him, what else is the nature of God than the nature of faith? . . . What else then is the being of God but the being of man, the absolute selflove of man? If thou believest that God is for thee, thou believest that nothing is or can be against thee. That God is an other being is only illusion. In declaring that God is for thee, thou declarest that he is thy own being. What then is faith but the infinite self-certainty of man, the undoubting certainty that his own subjective being is the objective, absolute being, the being of beings? (pp. 171, 172).

The world of belief is a world of "unlimited subjectivity."

23. Feuerbach, *Op. cit.*, § 2; cf. F. von Hügel's criticism of Feuerbach's principle in his *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion* (London, New York, 1940), pp. 20 ff.

In a special essay on "The Essence of Faith in Luther's Sense," Feuerbach even tried to prove the very identity of Luther's concept of faith with his "Essence of Christianity"! For the kernel of Luther's concept of God is the negation of Catholic positivity, and positively the assertion that Christ *is* only by being *for us*, that he exists only for our belief. "If God were sitting in heaven all alone by himself," Feuerbach quotes Luther, "like a stock, he were not God," and he continues: "God is a word the meaning of which is only man." God is the Thou of man. Having thus started from Luther's rendering belief more inward or existential, Feuerbach comes to fasten the Lutheran correlation of what is God's and what is man's to that end which is man, and to declare God to presuppose man because the theological essence of religion is altogether its anthropological one.[24]

As a principle this construction is already contained in Hegel, for according to him, too, the liberating achievement of the Reformation consists in Luther's victorious establishment that man's destination must take place "in himself," although he still accepted its contents as revealed from without. In his essay, *Protestantism and Romanticism* (Halle, 1839), A. Ruge, a radical pupil of Hegel and friend of Feuerbach, discerned the danger of this specifically Lutheran heresy, saying that in the "Protestant process of appropriation" the subject embraces only the proper Ego, the agent of the appropriation. Thus the process terminates simply in the negation of the general, universal and objective.[25]

In a similar way, Kierkegaard conceives Luther's protest. Just as Feuerbach carries out his disintegration of Christian belief while relying on Luther, so does Kierkegaard, too, in his attempt at a restoration, develop from Luther the thesis of inward appropriation. He is, however, more cautious and critical than Feuerbach with regard to Luther's significance.

> Take away from the Christian determinations the factor of personal appropriation, and what becomes of Luther's merit? But open to any page of his writings, and note in every line the strong pulse-beat of personal appropriation. . . . Did not the papacy have objectivity enough, objective determinations to the point of superfluity? What then did it lack? It lacked self-appropriation, inwardness.[26]

24. See K. Barth's article on Feuerbach in *Zwischen den Zeiten*, Vol. v (1927).
25. Cf. R. Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (New York, 1941), pp. 60 f.
26. *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, p. 327.

Luther's *pro me* and *pro nobis,*[27] from which Feuerbach draws the conclusion that the essence of belief is man's self-confidence, is translated by Kierkegaard as "passionate subjectivity." And just as Feuerbach regards Protestantism as the religious way of God's humanization, so does Kierkegaard say that it is the inherent danger of Protestantism to become a Christianity in the interest of man, and a reaction of the human against the Christian, as soon as it wants to exist for its own sake, changing from a "corrective" into a norm.[28] Though carrying the principle of appropriation to an extremity himself, Kierkegaard wants to avoid this danger and is thus forced to develop the "Christian ideality" as paradox, that is to say: it stands within the extreme tension of a God-relationship in which a proper act of appropriation holds fast to the disproportionateness of the otherness of its object. What is emphasized, however, in this paradoxical relation between the divine and the human is, nevertheless, the appropriation on the part of subjective inwardness. God is truth, but this *is* only for the belief of a person existing before him. "When an existing individual has not faith, God *is* not, neither does God *exist,* although understood from an eternal point of view God is eternally."[29] Hegel's proposition that God is essentially only "in thought," because the divine spirit which is comprehended or believed is the same as the comprehending one, becomes, by way of Feuerbach's principle of the anthropological essence of Christian truth, Kierkegaard's existential thesis, that God exists only in subjectivity and for the subjectivity of one's own God-relationship.

The radically subjective interpretation of the Christian faith—in terms of spiritual self-activity (Hegel), or sentimental humanity (Feuerbach), or passionate existence (Kierkegaard)—derives from Luther's Teutonic protest against Rome, and from his doctrine of justification by faith alone. German Protestantism is, indeed, as Nietzsche puts it: "the original sin of German philosophy." It determines the whole development from Kant to Hegel, and from Hegel to Nietzsche—all of them Lutherans.

27. Luther says, in his sermon on Isaiah 9:5, "Make the three letters UNS (us) as big as heaven and earth."

28. *Journals,* entry numbers 1298, 1304, 1327, 1379, 1406.

29. *Ibid.,* entry number 605.

A NOTE ON THE PURITAN "CALLING"

By Robert Martin Krapp

One of the criticisms which has been brought against the interpretation of the relations between Calvinism and capitalism first presented by Max Weber is that of dealing unhistorically with Puritan doctrinal opinions.[1] Weber and his followers are accused of reading into the Puritanism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries notions first broached in the eighteenth.[2] One of the fields of opinion where they are said to have erred most recklessly centers about the Puritan doctrine of the "calling."

Weber's thesis may be concisely stated in the following terms:

A major characteristic of capitalist culture is the notion of one's duty to be proficient in a calling, an obligation to the content of one's professional activity.[3]

Today capitalism itself inculcates this notion to a far greater degree than any other agency.[4]

Its sources, however, must be looked for in pre-capitalist periods. Among these sources is religion. Religion places certain psychological sanctions on the maintenance of the attitude prescribed by it, which are qualitatively different from those which worldly wisdom has at its disposal.[5]

The sanctions which Calvinism placed on belief and behavior of a given sort succeeded, perhaps accidentally, without the intention and despite the wishes of early Calvinists,[6] . . . but to a greater extent than the sanctions laid down by other churches, in developing over a period of time the characteristic of capitalist culture remarked above.[7]

It will be seen that Weber does not argue that capitalism evolved from Calvinism, or that Calvinism created capitalism. His argument is that Calvinism contained elements which, under the influences to which they were historically subjected, were capable of transformation into something which became useful to capitalism. Chief among these elements, it is submitted, was the Calvinist doctrine of the calling.

1. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,* tr. Talcott Parsons, (New York, 1930).
2. H. M. Robertson, *Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism,* (Cambridge, 1935), pp. 15-28.
3. Weber, *op. cit.,* 54.
4. *Ibid.,* 72.
5. *Ibid.,* 197.
6. *Ibid.,* 89-90.
7. *Ibid.,* 86-92.

Many Puritan divines dealt, either incidentally or at length, with the subject of the calling. It was a work particularly close to their hearts, because they justified their own conduct as reformers of the church and of society on the ground that they were effectually called to it. To go into the finer shades of the theory as elaborated by all the godly and painful clerics who handled it would be a work of great labor and little edification. In William Perkins, William Ames, and John Preston, however, we have three eminent yet representative English Puritans of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. An examination of what they said about the calling will help us determine the accuracy of Weber's theory and the worth of his critics' objections.

William Perkins wrote at length on the doctrine of the calling, and his graphic, schematic approach renders his account clear and useful.[8] Perkins points out the word "calling" is a direct translation from the Latin *vocatio,* and describes the situation to which God has called men on earth. This situation, or set of relations, is double in character. There is a general calling, which is the same for all Christians, and a particular, personal calling. The general calling of Christian men implies four duties: to invoke the name of God in Christ, to further the good estate of the true church of God by prayer, by edification, and by donations, to become a servant to one's brother-Christian, and finally to walk as one worthy of the position to which God has called one, by denying ungodliness and worldly lusts, and by living a sober, righteous, godly life.[9] Particular personal callings arise from diversity of inward gifts and distinction of outward order—both, conditions of God's ordaining.[10] Many rules apply to the particular personal calling. Everyone must have such a calling; beggars, rogues, vagabonds, and monks, who have no proper calling, are reprehensible in the sight of God. So evil is it to have no calling, that the severe statute of 39 Eliz. for the restraining of beggars and rogues is said to be "in substance the very law of God," and therefore never to be repealed.[11] Every man who has a particular personal calling must combine it with the general calling

8. *A treatise of the vocations, or callings of men, with the sorts and kinds of them, and the right use thereof, in The works of . . . Mr. William Perkins,* (London, 1612), I, 747-779.

9. *Ibid.,* 752-54.

10. *Ibid.,* 755.

11. *Ibid.*

of a Christian. In case of conflict, the personal must be subordinated to the general calling. Even where no direct conflict is involved, a man must still learn to use his personal calling in a good and holy manner.

Passing by, as largely irrelevant to our present purpose, the rules for choosing and entering upon a calling in a good and holy manner, we come to the interesting problem of continuing in a calling. The works of any given calling must have three qualities: they must be proper to the calling, profitable to the individual and to society, and necessary for the ends to be achieved.[12] The works of a calling must be done with holiness, by a double sanctification, first of the worker, then of the work. The worker must be sanctified, because unless man is born anew of water and spirit, he can look for no success or blessing in this life or the next.

> The blind divinity of the world is this, that such as walk diligently about their business, live peaceably with all men, and do no man hurt, have all things go well with them, and God will have mercy upon them. These things indeed are good and commendable, but not sufficient.[13]

For, unless men repent and die in Christ, they "will in the end prove no better than fig-leaves before God." The work also must be sanctified, in a double manner, by the word and by prayer. The word teaches one what vices to avoid in following one's calling. These are especially covetousness and injustice. The work of curbing covetousness consists, first, of removing one's affections from the world by asking God only for a sufficiency, accepting gratefully whatever is given in addition, but not seeking for it; and, second, of turning and disposing one's affections to better things than the world affords. Such turning and disposing of one's affections can be accomplished by having "the eyes of our minds" enlightened by God's spirit, and by planting deep in our hearts a sense of the want of Christ.[14] As for injustice, it is described as a vice dangerous, horrible, and widespread, exemplified in evil princes, bribe-taking magistrates, corrupt ministers, thievish lawyers, dishonest physicians, unjust merchants, despotic landlords, and selfish farmers. A vice so monstrous and well-nigh universal can be overcome only by seeking the contrary virtues, faith and love, which are to be sought with prayer.

12. *Ibid.*, 763-65.
13. *Ibid.*, 766.
14. *Ibid.*, 770.

In this manner, and only in this manner, will the works of any man's calling be done in a sanctified and holy manner.

Besides holiness, the other quality required in doing the works of one's calling acceptably is constancy. Perkins waxes bitter against those who encroach upon other men's callings. He scorns busybodies and astrologers, who peek and pry into the secrets of other men's callings; and he definitely forbids the taking of two callings by any one man, though two closely allied callings may be permitted, as in Melchizedek, who was both priest and king.[15] Constancy in one's calling is hindered by ambition, envy, impatience, and similar sins, all of which are severely reprobated. It is helped by free loans, forgiving of debts, and other acts of Christian charity which ease one's fellow men over rough spots, by occasional lawful vacations and recreations, and by changes of calling, which Perkins would allow in case either of private necessity or a notable public good.

Such is the general outline of the calling, as found in William Perkins. To this general framework William Ames adds several points of outline and emphasis. He agrees with Perkins that a calling is necessary, that no man lives honestly and acceptably to God without one, and hence that beggars and monks are utterly to be condemned.[16] An honest and acceptable calling may be recognized either from its being described in scripture or by analogy with those which are there described. Men who live by the vices of their fellow-humans, those who use ridiculous, foolish, immodest, or scurrilous arts—pimps, clowns, buffoons, and the like—follow dishonest callings. So also do usurers, and others who profit by the misfortunes of their fellow-Christians.

A lawful calling requires, in one who will follow it, seven attributes: knowledge born of experience (*peritia*), by which one keeps clearly in mind whatever belongs to one's own business; attention to one's own duty rather than another's; sedulous diligence; prudence in seeing, taking, and rightly using profitable opportunities; strength and constancy in overcoming difficulties; moderation of the love of gold, and of concern over one's ventures; and religious sanctification of one's labors.[17]

As to poverty and riches, Ames teaches with great vigor that prefer-

15. Genesis, 14:18.

16. *De conscientia et ejus jure vel casibus,* (Amsterdam, 1630), Book v, Chaps. 46, 47. The translation is my own.

17. *Ibid.,* 294-95.

ence of poverty above riches is utterly wrong. Simulated poverty, such as that of the monks, is a form of ingratitude to God and an injury to mankind. Voluntary poverty, directly sought, without special calling or outward necessity, is also wrong, and for seven reasons. A man who chooses voluntarily to be poor does not look out for himself and his family according to the order of nature approved by God; he chooses and seeks an evil which is reserved as a punishment; he rashly exposes himself to various temptations; and he renders himself unfit for many duties which are required of those who possess external faculties to perform them. If any having sustenance throws it away, expecting sustenance of God, he tempts God; he rejects what he daily seeks of God, that is, his daily bread; and he burdens unnecessarily those from whom he accepts sustenance, and defrauds the honest poor, who might be sustained were it not for him.[18]

Honest poverty, caused by external necessity, Ames teaches to be neither shameful nor wrong. Riches also are morally indifferent in themselves, but since they may be good by their use or convenience, they are rightly called gifts and blessings of God.[19] Nevertheless, because of the corruptions and infirmities of human nature, riches subject their owner to great and perilous temptations. They must not be sought as an end in themselves. Such inordinate desire of riches is evil, because repugnant to the love we should bear to God and our neighbors.[20] If riches flow upon one by God's grace, the soul must be fortified against those vices which generally accompany them. By prayer to God and by all religious zeal, riches must be reduced to our service, as instruments of piety.[21]

The outstanding feature in the teachings of Ames and Perkins is their insistence that the particular personal calling be subordinated to the general calling of Christians. Slothfulness is reprobated, diligence in one's private calling is encouraged; but there are strong suggestions, to say no more, that such diligence does not have to be learned from preachers. Discipline is the constant cry, organization of one's energies, their use in constructive, valuable channels. The tyranny of wealth is decried because it is anarchistic. It breaks the bounds of human and re-

18. *Ibid.*, 296.
19. *Ibid.*, 296-97.
20. *Ibid.*, 302.
21. *Ibid.*, 297.

ligious society; it is above, as monks and beggars are outside, the bonds of human organization.[22] Such lawlessness is utterly abhorrent to the preachers. They are concerned with the morality of human actions in a godly commonwealth; and the double personal responsibility of all men, to God and to their fellow creatures, is a living, breathing element of their thought. Even the literary style used by the preachers illustrates their concern with logical method and exact rules of moral discipline. Their discourses are organized precisely, sometimes at the expense of their entertainment value; their firstly, secondly, and thirdly can be arranged in a notebook with the clear perfection of a mechanical diagram. They have a system; they describe a method, a discipline.

The common error of imputing to capitalism in all its stages of development the forms which it took in the late eighteenth century and retained well through the nineteenth has led some scholars to suspect that the preachers, with their demands to control the acquisition and use of wealth, were not serving capitalist purposes, or were actually anti-capitalist in outlook.[23] But the anachronism is obvious. Unrestricted economic individualism did not spring full-grown from the brow of a youthful capitalism. It was the product of many years of capital-accumulation, of education, of unremitting change, experiment, and solidification of economic mores. During this slow, painful process, the actions of businessmen were restrained by disciplines of various sorts. Some of these disciplines were operated predominantly to the detriment of further capitalist expansion, as was the government headed by Laud and Strafford; others, regarded by many of their subjects as no less tyrannical, were in varying degrees susceptible to the control of influential elements within the middle class. Outstanding examples are the Protectorate of Cromwell and the Whig government of William and Mary. The mere fact that a disciplinary hand was held over the operations of capitalists at any given moment of history is no more than an approach to the problem of whether capitalism was

22. Cf. Perkins, "Epistle dedicatory" to *A treatise of the vocations*, *Works*, I, 748, "Against this (divine) order do offend two sorts of men," i.e., "Popish votaries . . . and wandering and straggling persons" and those who "do not practise their personal callings in and with the general."

23. R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, (New York, 1926), pp. 238-40; Robertson, *op. cit.*

helped or hindered by that discipline. Much depends upon the immediate circumstances and conditions of capitalism at that moment; much on the nature of the discipline. We must ask who controlled it, how thoroughly, and for what purposes.

Applying these questions to the godly discipline advocated by Perkins and Ames, we see that this discipline was to be exercised by the clergy with the assistance of the godly and respectable laity. In the concrete circumstances of seventeenth-century England, this meant that the poor, weak, subservient clergy were to share control of the discipline with a rich, powerful, independent middle class. How tightly the reins of discipline would have been held over the crying sin of covetousness under these circumstances we can only surmise. However, submission in secular and political affairs to priests of whatever doctrine or creed was never a major characteristic of the English Puritans.[24]

The purposes which a godly discipline might have served, had a proper one ever been set up in England, must also be a matter of conjecture. The English middle class was, by the middle years of the seventeenth century, too advanced and diversified to need or want a discipline as rigorous as Ames and Perkins had envisioned. Could such a discipline have been forced upon the nation by the London merchants, who stood for it most strongly, it would probably have resulted in a greater predominance of mercantile capital, a sharper conflict between town and country, and perhaps a more conservative development of commercial procedure. But we need not think that such a discipline would have been immune from change, and change in the same direction as that which actually took place, though doubtless it would have been differently colored and expressed. The godly discipline was perfectly capable of turning into the thinly disguised worship of wealth. In fact, by the early seventeenth century, it had already started to do so in some quarters.

The teachings of John Preston partially illustrate this transition, and give a very clear impression of the ease with which it took place.[25] Like Perkins and Ames, Preston insists upon the need to limit one's

24. See W. A. Shaw, *A history of the English Church During the Civil Wars and under the Commonwealth,* (London, 1900), Vol. I, *passim,* for a description of the thoroughgoing Erastianism of the Puritan parliament.

25. *Sin's overthrow: or a godly and learned treatise of mortification,* (London, 1641).

particular calling within the general calling of a Christian man. Love of wealth becomes inordinate, Preston says, when riches are sought by means that we should not use; for the wrong ends; in a wrong manner; or "by measure more than we should." Unlawful means are "usury, gaming, oppression, fraud, deceit, and any other unlawful means"[26]—(not, says the preacher, that he means to determine whether "playing for trifles to put life in the game be lawful, but of gaming with intent to get and gain money.")[27] Unlawful ends include the pursuit of money for itself, and with the purpose of bestowing it upon our lusts. Money is sought in a wrong manner when desire of it becomes inordinate. The five particulars of inordinate desire are when we seek wealth out of love to it, when we seek it to trust in it, when we think ourselves the better men for it, when we seek to glory in it, and when we seek it with too much haste and eagerness.[28] Riches are indeed the blessings of God, and as blessings we may desire them; but it should be by a remiss, rather than by a mature, ripe, and peremptory will. Moreover, we must be careful not to desire riches in superfluity. Such a desire of superfluity is an abuse of one's calling.

> The end of our calling is to serve God and men. The ground hereof is this. Every man is a member of the commonwealth; every man hath some gifts or other, which may not lie idle; every man hath some talents, and must use them to his master's advantage, and how can that be except you do good to men? Everyone is a servant to Christ, and must do God's work; no man is free, every one is Christ's servant, and must be diligent to serve Christ, and do good to men. He that hath an office must be diligent and attend to it; every man must attend his calling and be diligent in it.[29]

Riches accumulated as a result of diligence in one's calling are the wages, not the end of that calling. They may be taken as a blessing of God upon one's labor, as a reward; they should not be made the purpose of one's activities. In brief, one has obligations to the content of one's calling which are both divine and social in nature, and God will reward the fulfillment of these obligations. "The more diligent a man is in his calling, the more sincere and upright, the more doth God bless him and increase his riches."[30] From this doctrine one may learn

26. *Ibid.*, 246.
27. *Ibid.*, 247.
28. *Ibid.*, 248-49.
29. *Ibid.*, 254-55.
30. *Ibid.*, 256.

not to seek for greater wealth than God gives; for what God gives is proportioned to one's deserts.

> That which God gives every man, that is his portion here. *Eccles.* 5. 18. . . . *Objection.* How shall I know God's will and what my portion is? *Answer.* I answer, by the event. See in what estate and condition God hath set you: see what estate he hath given you, that is your portion.[31]

Here now is a basis for the comforting doctrine of the calling as the eighteenth century knew it. The essence of that doctrine was never that wealth is a good in itself; it was that activity in one's calling is a service to God, and that the intensity of that activity and the value of that service may be measured by a money standard.[32] This is not far from the teaching of Preston. If wealth is indeed the wages of service in a calling, then the wealthy man must have performed services acceptable to God, whether or not he seems to have outward grace. Wealth is a strong presumption of virtue. The rich are rich because they are diligent, sincere, and upright in their callings. They are called to wealth by the direct appointment of God, and continue in that happy condition through their sincerity, uprightness, and diligence. The poor may console themselves with honest labor in their humble spheres, and with the reflection that at least they are not rogues or vagabonds.

The eighteenth-century doctrine of the calling was not explicitly stated by Preston in the early seventeenth century, but most of its major features can easily be deduced from what Preston says. The changes which occurred involved chiefly the weakening or removal of specifically religious sanctions upon economic activity. As the clergy themselves became increasingly parasitic, the religious theory of their necessity and the necessity of the supernatural grace which they, as Christ's representatives, bestowed, waned in importance. It was indeed a comfortable religion for a merchant which William Perkins described, in which the mercantile sinner drew up a constant bill of receipts (i.e., blessings temporal and spiritual) and expenses (i.e., abuses, ignorances, frailties, and negligences) for presentation on the last day to an omnipotent auditor. But it was inevitable, Perkins thought,

> that our reckonings will be far short of that which God requireth at our hands. . . . What then shall we say? that we have walked in our callings and always

31. *Ibid.*, 246.
32. Tawney, *op. cit.*, pp. 246-53.

had a good meaning and did no man hurt; and therefore we hope that God will be merciful? This indeed is the common excuse, but it is not sufficient payment with God. . . . Wilt thou make up thy reckoning with alms deeds and good works, according to the opinion of many? . . . But they are no current payment in this account. . . . Thus, then, having turned ourselves every way, and finding no help in anything, we must fly unto our surety Christ Jesus.[33]

A generation more skilled in the blind divinity of the world and less confident of the political arithmetic of preachers was at little or no trouble to substitute for the surety of Christ that of the Bank of England, and for the surety of a godly discipline that of a steadily advancing rate of profit.

33. *Works,* I, 778-79. Cf. L. B. Wright, "William Perkins," in *Huntington Library Quarterly,* III, (Jan., 1940), 182.

ON THE MEANING OF SACRIFICE

By Paul Shana

I

Sacrifice, the oldest religious rite of primitive man, is also the most recently discovered source of religious and moral insight. True, we no longer slaughter prize bulls, destroy virgins by fire, or cut off our fingers as supplicatory gifts to the gods. And though we may not entirely renounce the world, we do give up certain aspects of it, and endure suffering and privation for what we consider to be noble ends. Once the climax of religious ritual and feeling, sacrifice as such, in its physical aspects, consists now only in the recalling to pious memory of a great sacrifice of the past. The collection plate may indeed be claimed as representative of an offering, but the needs that primitive sacrifice subserved are answered in Christianity primarily by prayer, myth, dogma, and the standards of morality. Sacrifice, that is, has become ideal. But though it is less easily observable, it is still a condition for all morality that has gone beyond the immediate satisfaction of physical needs.

Sacrifice, in fact, is only one example of an urge that is fundamental to all living things and is observable in all human behavior and history. This urge is the urge for security, meaning by this not the peace of mind that comes from retirement from the world, but that condition in which—whether in retirement *or* in worldly activity—all the needs of life are under control. Security is a situation and a feeling, defined by the possession of means whereby elements formerly unmanageable and arousing fear have become determinate and within our control. It is a state of equilibrium between needs and satisfactions. Security is thus a function of the struggle for existence and adjustment to environment. When control is possessed, the struggle has been won and the adjustment made—at least until new conditions arise and a new adjustment becomes necessary.

Both in its primitive ritual aspects and in its modern religious and ethical senses, sacrifice is an attempt to make this control possible by endeavoring to adjust the nervous mechanism of the individual organism to the external conditions that are involved. An external stimulus does not evoke the same response from all living things; variations in

response and meaning are determined by early conditionings, habits, and cultures. Certain responses are linked together in a complex chain of behavior, or pattern of morality. Values—esthetic, moral, social, or religious—are of this nature. The attempt to change such responses is the attempt to change generations of encrusted habit. Yet sacrifice is precisely such an attempt. Sacrifice is an attempt at reformulation of habits and responses, in other words, at learning. In religious sacrifice, however, what is learnt is more than a way of doing a certain thing in a certain new way; what is learnt is a new system, or level, of responding, a new pattern of emotional reaction, a new phase of finalistic meanings. Ostensibly, it is a richer, more extensive, more logically and evolutionally advanced system of responses, making greater control over the stimulus or type of stimulus possible. The method of this reformulation and extension of response in sacrifice is a process of detachment and attachment from respective fields of behavior. Since the interplay of too many conflicting responses at one time would result in confusion and disintegration, one set of responses has to be relinquished for another set which has been stimulated or awakened by new environmental conditions. Sacrificial acts or rites are attempts at bringing about this relinquishment of old responses and attachment, or conditioning, to new ones.

But we must distinguish between reformulation of habits, learning of new responses, within a given system of morality or religion, and reformulation of habits and learning of new responses consequent upon extensions and changes in the morality or religion itself. Sacrifice is the unlearning of an old religion, or of an old religious concept, feeling, or totem, and the learning of a new; not merely a single response but a whole method or system of responses is involved. But it is a religious rite, not merely a lesson in learning; it has to do with those responses relative to changed conceptions of the sacred and the profane.

II

According to common sense, sacrifice is the "giving up of a possession for a greater good." In the game of baseball, a "sacrifice hit" is one in which the player at bat deliberately hits the ball so that, although he is counted out, another player already on base is able to make a greater advance (possibly score a run) than if the batter had merely singled. An individual can thus make a sacrifice for the good of

a group. An individual can also, however, make a sacrifice which concerns no one but himself. For example, he may decline an invitation to an excellent dinner—with its attendant cheerful sociability and no expense—in order that he may listen to a concert that gives him aesthetic sustenance, though he is quite alone and buys his own ticket. To sacrifice an individual interest for a group interest is only one kind of sacrifice; nor can it be said that sacrifice for an individual interest alone is always a case of selfishness or egotism.

In analytical terms, to sacrifice means to dispense with one object (or group of objects) of interest or value as the necessary condition for the attainment of an object (or group of objects) of interest that is richer, more extensive, and conducive to greater control. Our analysis is in agreement with common sense. Wherever it be found, whether within the sphere of religious or non-religious (properly so-called) behavior, to sacrifice is to give up a possession for a greater good. As a religious rite, the possession that is given up is always a physical object —primarily food, but also human beings or parts of the body, such as hair, nail-cuttings, fingers, etc. In the more advanced cultures and civilizations, the possession sacrificed is likewise physical in most cases, but the emotional, moral, or other evaluative meanings attached to the possession are surrendered along with it.

Sacrifice is inherent in all moral discrimination and in everyday activity. Such sacrifice, of course, is not essentially religious, though the system of morality implied in it may have originated in a time of religious tension. Everyday, practical, social sacrifice is not the initial attempt at a redirection of response and behavior, but rather a result or example of it. There are, thus, not two kinds, but two phases, of sacrificial behavior: the initial or religious phase, in which an entirely new kind of moral discrimination is attempted, and the everyday, common phase, the heritage and tradition of religious sacrifice.

The study of primitive sacrifice is an excellent field for the analysis of religious sacrifice in the sense of response-modification and learning. We turn now to an analysis of the theories of this subject.

III

Discussions and theories of the primitive sacrificial rite have been numerous and by no means agreeing. The major theories may be classified as follows: (1) *The idealistic or divine communion theory,* enter-

tained by Robertson Smith (the leader of thought in this field), F. B. Jevons, and apparently the majority of writers on the subject. Sacrifice is considered to be a "sacramental communion" between worshiper and worshiped. The nature of the communion, of the worshiped, i.e., of the gods, and what practical or moral result the communion has upon the worshiper are not adequately explained. (2) *The utilitarian theory:* Tylor, Frazer, Westermarck, Spencer, etc. Here sacrifice is either purely a gift, a bribe, or, for all intents and purposes, an economic exchange. Its function is to secure favor, avert evil, appease wrath, or to pay homage. As such, sacrifice, though it is a dealing with "gods," is not essentially different from dealing with human beings, except that the gods are more powerful and therefore especially to be feared and placated by gifts. (3) *The psychological theory:* Freud, Money-Kyrle, Alliers, and others. Here sacrifice is interpreted according to an a priori psychological prejudice. The Freudians make sacrifice the fulfilment of the wish for patricide. If patricide were the symbol of the killing of a totem or god, which is to say, an ideal or moral value, in order to absorb it, this theory would resemble Durkheim's; but apparently it is the other way round—sacrifice is rather the symbol of patricide. Alliers' theory is that religion as a whole is mainly a matter of autosuggestion, and sacrifice merely a supplement to prayer. As we shall see later, however, prayer is really an ideal extension of sacrifice. (4) *The naturalistic theory:* Santayana, Durkheim, and other naturalistic writers. Whether a gift or a communion, the meaning of sacrifice is still unclear if the essential thing—the nature of the gods concerned—is not explained. With Santayana and Durkheim, the gods are shown to exist only in the idealizing imaginations of men themselves, and sacrifice is therefore a relation between two aspects of man himself—his material and his ideal selves. Sacrifice is thus psychological, a function of man in his natural environment. It is, according to these writers, a renunciation of goods as a step in the development and achievement of ideals.

If the divine communion theory is not suitable for a naturalistic theory of religion, the utilitarian theory leaves too many factors unaccounted for. If sacrifice is the act of presentation of a gift to a god as man to man, of what value could such objects as cut-off fingers, the entrails of an ox, a lock of hair, nail-parings, etc., be to a god? How, further, could the sacrifice of victims who are neither offered to a god nor eaten, but buried, cast away in a desert place, or burned (holo-

causts) be explained? Of what significance are the important attendant factors of shedding of blood, fire, and eating, to the idea that sacrifice is merely the presentation of a gift? How can those sacrifices be explained in which the offering is identified with the deity, and in the slaying of the animal the deity himself is slain? If sacrifice were merely a practical gift, how long could we expect even the most primitive of men to continue such a practice, seeing, as he must, the inefficacy and wastefulness of the bribe? And if, as Durkheim points out, it is the function of the deity to assure food to men, it seems unlikely that the sacrifice, in its turn, should consist in a presentation of food to the divinity.

Even within the utilitarians' explanation, in fact, there is more than one meaning of "giving" or "gift." Sometimes sacrifice is purely an economic exchange, sometimes a bribe with a kind of undercover intent, sometimes purely a gift to express homage. Sometimes, according to the different theorists, a return is expected and sometimes not, and the return may be in kind or equal value, or not. Let us then analyze the kinds of "giving" and the determinants of its value in different contexts. Our purpose is not to define or redefine these meanings and the terms given to them from any particular prejudice, but rather from an analysis of the situations in which they are used.

1. *Barter*—an economic exchange in which a physical good is given to an other person in return for a physical good of equal or similar economic value. (Of course, money or credit may be substituted for one part of the exchange, and non-physical goods offered as well.) There are no further attendant circumstances beyond the bare act of exchange, and the presence of such circumstances in the form of special invocations, gestures, and symbols that recognizably adhere to social or religious ceremonies, games, or presentations, is sufficient to distinguish the function from a purely economic exchange. "Barter" used in connection with non-physical goods (exchanges of service, acts of kindness, social or aesthetic goods, etc.) is merely a metaphorical use of the term.

2. *Gift*—a presentation of goods or services to a specially selected individual whose relation to the giver or whose previous act of kindness makes him an object of special regard to him. A forced "gift" or bribe, as to an exacting chief or tyrant, is not, properly speaking, a gift, but simply an extortion or exploitation. An offering is not a gift unless it is made without coercion, as a voluntary expression of regard. To

give a gift or present is to give honorifically; there are sentiments exchanged not present in barter. But there are few social relationships, of kin or friendship, that do not express themselves by means of an exchange of physical goods, or, at times, of physiological graces (handshake, embrace, etc.). It would be as absurd to attribute a sexual significance to the end-in-view of the latter as it is to attribute an economic one to the former. Nevertheless, to point to the purely physical or economic origin or basis of these acts—as long as we do not make them exclusive ends or sufficient as distinguished from merely necessary conditions is to belittle or derogate them in no way. It is rather to point to the continuity of nature and of the levels of behavior.

If a return in kind is expected in presenting a gift (as it frequently is), it is one expressive of similar honorific regard, and not necessarily of similar economic value. Conventional "duty" or expectancy in the way of recompense, for example, is satisfied in the case of volunteer workers in social service, whose only reward may be a dollar a year, a medal, a scroll, or merely public extolment. Nevertheless, few social acts do not have an economic aspect; living is done *in* a material and biologic world, and spiritual, aesthetic, or religious functions likewise have their conventional economic values.

3. *Sacrifice*—Rarely does an element of sacrifice enter into economic exchange. A "sacrifice sale" is one in which goods are offered at far below normal price in order to retrieve cost and dispense with possible profit. But this sacrifice is for the benefit of the merchant only; consumers save money, but they are not the ends-in-view of the sacrifice. Sacrifice is more readily an element in the offering of gifts. A gift by an individual to a social group may be spoken of as a sacrifice (of time, labor, money, etc.) if the offering is instigated by ideals of service and not preceded by a benefit derived from the group.

Like a gift, and unlike barter, sacrifice is symbolic giving; its value is more in the formal act and the attendant circumstances than in the object given—the object *is* important, but less so. Sacrifice is a "giving up," as disinguished from mere giving, or "handing across." What is given is given up to a cause or ideal or object of greater value. The object sacrificed may be anywhere in the range of values—physical, emotional, or spiritual. Personal goods are given up for social ends; physical goods for emotional ends; physical, emotional, and social goods for spiritual ends.

The principle of levels of being is observable in all phases of existence. It is not simply a principle to explain the nature of life and mind, or at least the order in which they are found, but of responses and behavior within them as well. Thus, practical giving, in form, can exist wherever symbolic giving is, since it is its natural basis and necessary condition. Confusion arises in attempts to explain or explain away the higher, that is, added, more extensive and more significant layers by pointing only to the lower layer. The theory of sacrifice as mere gift or barter, and the economic, geographical, and psychological determinism theories of cultures, are all alike in this respect.

The *value* or *significance* of an act of giving is determined by the following: (1) *What is given*—its economic and personal (e.g., sentimental) value both to the donor, who must have been willing to part with so much good, and to the recipient. (2) *To whom it is given*—giving to a person of equal status is not as significant as giving to an eminent person, a chief, a god. (3) *By whom it is given*—an object given by an eminent person, a chief, or supposedly, a god, is more significant than one given by person of equal status. Likewise, an object given by a group or tribe en masse, as in sacrificial rites, makes the act of giving more memorable, auspicious, and effective. (4) *The attendant circumstances*—psychological, aesthetic, and social effects, decorations, invocations, special time and place, eating, special costume, and what representatives of the divisions of society are present. (5) *The occasion*—in barter, whenever there is a need, i.e., a practical, immediate need. In gift-offering, at birth, marriage, birthdays, holidays, anniversaries, etc.; in sacrifice, the same occasions as gifts, but also on the occurrence of disease, war, drought, and other public disaster, on the inception of an enterprise, moving into a new house, breaking ground for tillage, on the arrival of a guest, and other memorable occasions. (6) *For what ostensible end*—what compensation or return, if any, is expected? Barter expects a return of equal economic value. Alms-giving, charity, expects no return; it is both gift and sacrifice. A gift of homage may be said to be itself a return, i.e., an expression of regard for something already done or existent. *Sacrifice* expects a return in moral control or support.

Through this analysis, the distinction between the ritual acts of primitive sacrifice and the acts of barter and gift-offering should be clear. Further distinction or comparison would only point out the ob-

vious. It is clear that in economic exchange there is neither a special gathering of the tribe at an auspicious time and place, an atmosphere of solemnity, fear, or respect, a special invocation and prayer; nor is a tribal totem or a victim of "ancient repute of natural holiness," as Robertson Smith says,[1] offered in exchange.

The significance of eating at sacrificial rites is not in its resemblance to "communion" or taking in of gods, which even Durkheim believed, but in the fact that food was primitive man's chief persistent need, the center of the largest proportion of his responses and behavior. This fact also explains why food is the most frequent found totem and the main object of sacrifice. "The food-quest," as Ames says, "is the most engrossing fact of primitive existence . . . it takes precedence over every interest. . . . The mystery and uncertainty connected with the appearance of vegetation and with the ways of animals and fish would contribute to make the food object important. . . . Precisely this fixing of attention, heightening of emotion, and recurrent stimulation make things sacred or taboo."[2]

This "fixing of attention," "heightening of emotion," and "recurrent stimulation" of everyday life was brought to a climax in the rite of sacrifice. It did not take long for primitive man to recognize in the food object the end of the largest proportion of his struggles and hunger-pains, the furnisher of sensations of taste and feelings of satiety, the relief from anxiety, uncertainty, and further search. So persistent was the need, and so dominating the quest for food, that the food-object became the symbol of a final good, an "immutable" on his behavioral horizon, the end of the search for at least one kind of certainty.

Therefore, when primitive man lays upon the sacrificial altar an object around which most of his existence and his hopes have been centered, he is laying part of his inner self upon it as well. With the piece of food to be sacrificed go the sensations and emotions, as well as any feelings of subjection it may have evoked. What happens to a sacrificial object has a correlative effect upon the responses habitually connected with it. Every significant change in the environment entails psychological and moral consequences in the individual—consequences involving changed reactions, new habits, different methods of control.

What is known as substitute sacrifice—by which the gods are satisfied

1. *Religion of the Semites* (New York, 1889), p. 378.
2. *The Psychology of Religious Experience* (Boston, 1910), p. 120.

if an object of lesser importance and value is offered in place of an intended victim, a bull instead of a human being, a lock of hair or finger-joint instead of a death wound—is verification of the theory that the function and value of the sacrificial rite is not so much in what was sacrificed as in the *act* of offering itself. As an attempt at learning to redirect moral response from one to another type of stimulus, sacrifice is a question of behavior. The learning of new ways of response can be effected, in the end, only by actually *trying* to respond. It is an experimental process, and the attempt does not cease until adjustment has been made, adequate response conditioned. The stimulus remains constant as an event in the environment, but it takes many attempts and serial conditionings to bring about a method of response. When the totem is fixed in imagination, the process of "taking it in," of adjusting the organism to it, of responding to it, becomes paramount.

Substitute sacrifice apparently arises in the later stages of religious growth, and represents an advance in that the formal basis of the rite is recognized. It is not quite the same as what Frazer calls "mock sacrifice,"[3] which is an even greater advance. In the former, an animal is killed where in previous years a human being was killed. In mock sacrifice, the rite is carried out just as if the slaughter were about to take place, but no damage is done beyond perhaps a scratch on the throat to let a few drops of blood show. In some tribes, as Frazer has pointed out, the man supposed to lead the rite actually swings his knife and works himself into a frenzy, but other men (representing the moral conscience of the tribe?) run forward to stop the knife before damage is done. "Cost," as Tylor, in his utilitarian way, suggests, "may be economized without impairing efficiency."[4]

Substitute and mock sacrifice are notable advances in the sacrificial rite. It is not only that bloodshed, murder of innocents, waste of goods is done away with and a more "civilized" culture made possible, but an important psychological and moral advance has taken place in the people for whom this kind of sacrifice becomes sufficient. Sacrifice may now be effected in imagination, ideally. Each member of the tribe may make the substitution within himself, freeing his imagination and thus achieving a far greater control over the potentialities of physical existence, over the necessity and non-necessity of the material condi-

3. E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture* (New York, 1889), II, p. 397.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 398.

tions of life than he could have had before. When formal conditions are understood and controlled, material things lose their exigency, their constraint, their indeterminacy, and their dread. Formal or ideal sacrifice sets the stage for the great ideal sacrifices of advanced religions. One act of sacrifice, performed under conditions of tension, social unrest, and expectation, draws all men unto it and includes them in its moral efficacy. In Christianity, the sins of all men are redeemed by the sacrifice of Jesus, who has taken these sins upon himself. Sacrifice becomes *redemption*.

To say that sacrifice is a gift is like saying, as the Greeks did, that art is imitation. They are assertions of similar method, and both exhibit the same fallacy. Both theories are descriptions of immediately observable facts, or the form that these facts apparently follow. But they are, obviously, too facile and superficial. Art imitates nature only in borrowing its subject matter and pattern, and in making its beginning as an extension of nature. Art means, for men, taking nature into their own hands, changing its form, use, and significance. Sacrificial art—for sacrifice, like all religion, is art—is the taking hold of nature, of certain natural objects ordinarily used within a culture, in order to change their *moral* significance. Man is only one of many elements in existence, and, in his interaction with his environment, he transfers his attention from one to another group or type of object. As his life grows more complex, his social patterns more intricate, his control over environment more extensive and secure, his moral and psychological attachments, including also his aesthetic sources of delight, must likewise change. Because social, economic, and industrial patterns are external, they are changeable without too great disturbance within themselves. It is man himself that is slow to change. Biological growth—and moral development is an extension of it—is not the same as building a house. There are no old habits to break in inanimate objects before they can be re-arranged. But man himself, primitive or modern, is a stronghold of age-encrusted conditionings, beliefs, dependencies, attachments, patterns of response. To change these means to change human nature itself.

Sacrifice is the attempt on the part of man to adjust his moral and psychological life to the changing environment around him requiring new responses, new attachments, new beliefs. Sacrifice is an experiment in fortitude, in the ability to withstand the loss of old responses and

familiar attachments. Sacrifice has to do with the possession and loss of moral attachments, of criteria of behavior, of values that are subjective in the sense that they are the media of readjustment to a changing environment requiring changed responses, the ground where impressions and stimuli meet to be judged, evaluated, responded to.

IV

The advantage of the utilitarian theory of sacrifice is that, although it underestimates the function of the rite, it does draw attention to the empirical facts. The "divine communion" theory, if it does nothing else, at least has the advantage of reminding us that sacrifice is not, after all, a purely utilitarian affair. But if, according to the latter theory, sacrifice is defined as "sacramental communion," or "ceremonial contact with sacred objects," or a rite that "binds man and god together," we are still in the dark as to what practical effect this communion has upon the worshipers. Sacrifice, like all religion, is a phenomenon of behavior and, as such, must be analyzed psychologically.

Perhaps it is not surprising that the concept of "divinity," referring to an abstract entity, cause, or locus *outside* of the creative imagination and life of man, has persisted longest in the study of religion itself. Even the utilitarian theory, attempting to explain sacrifice in as simple and empirical a manner as possible, did not question the fact that sacrifice, if it was a gift, was a gift to the gods, leaving the nature of the gods untold. Thus, though starting from different vantage points, both utilitarian and communion theories described sacrifice as a relation between a man or group of men in one locus and a god or group of gods in another locus.

Sacrifice was defined in terms of its effect on the worshipers apparently for the first time in 1899. Hubert and Mauss, writing in *L'Année Sociologique* of that year, defined sacrifice as follows: "Sacrifice is a religious act, which, by the consecration of a victim, modifies the state of the moral person who performs it, or of certain objects in which this person is interested." This is the method employed since by the French sociological school in the study of religion. There are fewer terms in their theories which do not refer to empirical objects, acts, or situations within the life of man than in previous, idealistic, theories of religion, yet they do not commit the reductive fallacies of the materialists and utilitarians. That there are still remainders of idealistic and

therefore somewhat obscure thinking in their writing, and that there is an undue emphasis on the *social* as cause or origin of religious phenomena is indeed true. When Durkheim, for example, defines "a sacrifice" as being "composed of two essential elements: an act of communion and an act of oblation; the worshiper communes with his god by taking in a sacred food, and at the same time he makes an offering to this god,"[5] there is no more indication of what "communion" refers to than there is in Robertson Smith, for example. And, although his discussion clarifies the meaning of "communion," "cult," "god," "totem," etc., in more naturalistic terms, the precise psychological or social results in terms of response and behavior are not clarified.

There is more than one resemblance between the writing of Durkheim and that of Santayana. The following is a paragraph from Durkheim, describing the function of cults:

> It (cult) keeps sacred beings alive and is perpetually remaking and regenerating them. Of course it is not the material oblations which bring about this regeneration by their own virtues; it is the mental states which these actions, though vain in themselves, accompany or reawaken. The real reason for the existence of the cults, even of those which are the most materialistic in appearance, is not to be sought in the acts which they prescribe but in the internal and moral regeneration which these acts aid in bringing about. The things which the worshiper really gives his gods are not the foods which he places upon the altars, nor the blood which he lets flow from his veins; it is his thought.[6]

Durkheim calls the act of sacrifice an "act of renouncement,"[7] and Santayana's well-known phrase is, "Renunciation is the condition of all genuine achievement."[8] The function of sacrifice is more eloquently though not dissimilarly described by Santayana as follows:

> The gods, in asking for a sacrifice, may invite us to give up not a part of our food or of our liberty but the foolish and inordinate part of our wills.

Foolish, perhaps, because inordinate; and inordinate in the sense of being unordered, uncontrolled by the new response.

> The sacrifice may be dictated to us not by a jealous enemy needing to be pacified but by a far-seeing friend, wishing we may not be deceived. If what we

5. *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (New York, 1915), p. 342.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 346.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 343.
8. *Reason in Religion* (New York, 1928), p. 38.

are commanded to surrender is only what is doing us harm, the god demanding the sacrifice is our own ideal . . . he is the goal that determines for us how we should proceed in order to realize as far as possible our inmost aspiration.[9]

The act of sacrifice is thus moral development itself in its psychological process. Sacrifice, that is, is a function of two aspects of the individual organism—the past that is habitual and the future that must be learned. It is a recognition on the one hand of the flux of existence, and, on the other, of the necessity for the moral self to adjust itself to the flux. Sacrifice is an act on the part of man to free himself from habits that are no longer effective in answering the requirements either of new environmental conditions or of his own natural growth from infancy to maturity.

Every external element in man's environment that finds its way to his perception and attention elicits in him a corresponding response. Objects have meaning, however slight and unpretentious. He is attracted to, he is repelled from, or he is indifferent to an object; or, in moments of vacillation and indecision, he combines two or even all three attitudes. Man is one element in a world of interrelated phenomena. His major concern is to bring other phenomena within his control. Ostensibly, he seeks this control only as a means to bring about the satisfaction of his angry and incessant needs. But needs become extensive and complex; he no longer finds peace only in the satisfaction of this or that particular need or desire, but in discovering the sources of control of these satisfactions, in finding power over the means that enable him to reach the much-desired state of integrated equilibrium and harmony.

In dealing with sacrifice, we are dealing with this principle—the search for control, security, equilibrium—in its psychological and, in advanced stages, moral aspects; but morality, of course, is an extension of psychology, which is its necessary condition. Progress means more than building the complex structures of society—systems and technologies of production, distribution, communication, planned economies. Man is not simply a cog in a machine; not, at least, until he learns, if he can, to respond as one. Though he is individual and a simple unit *as* an individual, he is a complex and constitutive one. He cannot be moved around as if he were a peg on a chart. Unlike pegs and inani-

9. *Ibid.*

mate objects, he must learn; every movement, every new event, requires adjustment, harmonious response. Sacrifice is such a learning process. As an act, sacrifice is a single, unequivocal, and necessary attempt at moral self-education and self-control, at meeting events on their own as well as man's terms.

To study primitive religion is to find empirical verification and ground for Dewey's dictum: "Devotion to rites, stories, and revery springs on its magical side from practical desire to control the contingent; but in larger measure it embodies the happiness that attends the sense of a successful issue from the uncertainly hazardous."[10] It is true that in sacrificial rites there is a large, though not necessarily larger, measure of "embodiment of happiness" that attends the sense of achievement of control. This is expressed in the "attendant circumstances" of the rite—the costumes, the eating, the assemblage, and so on. It is not improbable that the "eating" of a victim, interpreted by many writers, including Durkheim, as an act of "communion," is merely the expression of happiness following the consummation of the sacrificial rite and the sense of control it no doubt instilled.

A clue to the origin of sacrifice may be found in Dewey's statement: "To re-enact the vicissitudes, crises, and tragedies of life under conditions that deprive them of their overt dangers is the task of dramatic imagination and art."[11] Though this refers especially to literary art, it is not unlikely that sacrificial art—and all rites are arts—arose in the same manner. To narrate a tale of the killing of a man, whether by a wild animal, an aroused chieftain, or pure chance, is the art of story-telling. To re-enact the scene on a stage is drama. To take things into his own hands and re-enact a killing when there was no danger actually threatening was primitive man's way of attempting to secure a more direct control of the powers that lurk behind dangers. In a sense, this is merely imitative magic. But it is imitative only in the sense that all art is, or seems superficially to be, imitative, and magic only in the sense that all religion is, or seems to be, magic. In a larger sense, it is a psychologically efficacious instrument, a step in the process of learning and control. By adjusting himself to conditions which are under his control, and which resemble conditions in the outside world which are not in his control, primitive man arms himself thereby with a potent

10. *Experience and Nature* (New York, 1926), p. 89.
11. *Ibid.*

inward force to cope with those conditions when he encounters them. The use of the word "resemble" implies no "as-ifness" in the situation; as far as learning, habit, and response are concerned, actual and resembling conditions are, in respect of structure, form, or pattern, identical. If he has learned to use his newly won powers, primitive man *has* control. The presence of new or real conditions serve merely to test it.

It is a practical truism that the quickest and most enduring, though not necessarily the easiest way to put an end to the poignancy of persistent desires is to do away with them—that is, psychologically: to inhibit them, deny them, "give them up." Philosophies of indifference, stoicism, and asceticism are based on this attempt. When, as in these philosophies, sacrifice becomes a permanent and consistent trait of conduct, it does not depend so much on set sacrificial rites determined as to time, place, and circumstance, but on a conditioned and persistent mode of response. Asceticism is the supreme form and fruition of sacrifice. It is a way of life, not merely a special and localized rite. Or rather, it is that first localized rite, wherever and whenever it took place, the psychological and moral fruits of which have been made to endure permanently as a conditioning trait of conduct.

It is frequently overlooked, however, by students of asceticism, that in spite of assertions and claims made by the ascetics themselves that they have given up "all," "everything," all "worldly goods" and "possessions," "the flesh," "the body," and so on, there needs must remain some semblance of attachment to the world and to some aspect of the organism itself in order for life to persist at all. Attachment to "spirit," "God," "love," still have their naturalistic bases, even though the moral emphasis of the ascetic himself be so far removed from them as to make him oblivious of them. Of Epicurus the Stoic, for example, Paul Elmer More has made the perspicacious remark that, for this moralist, the dominant ideal, the end-in-view, is neither pleasure, nor cessation of desire, nor a balanced mean of the two merely for the sake of an arbitrary balance, but peace and security.[12] When he enjoined "all" desires, Epicurus meant all fleshly and worldly desires, for one desire at least was surely potent in him—the desire for peace of mind. Actually, he preached detachment from one *type* of desire, and re-attachment to another, spiritual, type. Nevertheless, though he may not have en-

12. P. E. More, *Hellenistic Philosophies* (Princeton, 1923), p. 23.

tertained the idea of sacrifice consciously, it is true that Epicurus preached both the necessity for and the necessary psychological condition of sacrifice.

"Primitive man," as one anthropologist puts it, "is afraid of one thing, of the uncertainties of the struggle of life."[13] Magic, which seeks to solve the problem of "how can a desirable object be coerced" is an attempt to end these uncertainties by trying to control the action of objects. Sacrifice attempts to end the uncertainties by moral control over the individual's own response. Fear created the gods; *in* the gods lies security, freedom from fear. The rite of "killing the tree-spirit" among certain tribes is intended, according to Frazer, to "ensure the revival of nature in spring."[14] The motive for killing divine men was to "arrest the forces of decomposition in nature by retrenching with ruthless hand the first ominous symptoms of decay."[15] Existence is a flux, indeterminate, unstable, subjecting. Life consists in arresting and controlling the flux wherever possible and necessary, establishing stabilities, finding permanence and security. But security, peace, is also power. We have peace because of the power that enables us to be free of the uncertainties, dissatisfactions, and frustrations of a world over which control has been won.

If an unprejudiced regard for all the facts is respected, it cannot be said that sacrificial rites are for social ends only, that consolidation is their chief function. An individual's behavior toward his group will change after a sacrificial experience because he now responds in a different fashion to *all* environment. As Durkheim said, sacrifice does not bring man into contact with the gods, but renews the contact with them which he originally had. So, sacrifice does not consolidate men, but renews, strengthens, extends the consolidation originally possessed. Gregariousness and ritualism are early characteristics of man. People must be on good terms with one another *before* they will consent to join one another in a religious rite. Religion extends, solidifies, sanctifies sociability; sacrifice and religion, like all traits of behavior whatsoever, occur *in* a social milieu. Ants, fish, and apes that live in schools or clans may have no religion that we can observe, but they do have the necessary social solidarity for one.

13. P. Radin, *Primitive Religion* (New York, 1937), p. 23.
14. *The Dying God* (New York, 1935), p. 266.
15. *Ibid.*, Preface, p. v.

V

Sacrifice, like all religion, like all art, was not a sudden and deliberate invention. Like all customs and rites, it began accidentally and unconsciously, as an extension of the common and familiar. Sacrifice is an extension of the automatic adjustment to the experience of losing valued possessions, and of all giving, whether economic or appreciative. Animal and savage life is a struggle in its most brutal aspects for the protection and nourishment of life. Loss of life and of its necessary means is continual. Primitive man recognized—though with no great awareness in our sense of the term—that in his adjustment to such losses there was a powerful means of environmental control. If he could make that loss deliberate—in giving, i.e., giving "up," surrendering—his method of control, through the process of detachment and reattachment, of redirection of response and learning, was made secure.

If sacrifice is the attempt to achieve, as crudely and ruggedly as possible, a "communion with the gods"—in the sense we have shown this to have—the next question was, how to preserve that communion? Thence arose prayer, myth, symbol, temple, dogma, and theology, all serving to make the momentary and immediate communion of sacrifice as enduring as possible. Prayer later becomes the foremost substitute for sacrifice. As discourse, it is a less hazardous, more refined, and more easily repeatable way of perpetuating meanings, responses, and methods of control. Sacrificial meanings and symbols are present in most primitive prayer. What is offered up is not body and food, but the psychological centeredness about these things, their moral sufficiency. In its purely subjective nature, prayer is ideal sacrifice.

Santayana says that sacrifice expresses fear, and prayer expresses need. But surely fear and need are expressed by both, for need that is sure of its end has no reason to call on the gods for assistance, and need uncertain of its end is fear or its symbolic counterpart, indeterminancy and lack of control. Prayer is actually the extension of sacrifice—it probably had its origin in the "name-calling" at totemic rites. Like sacrifice, the efficacy of prayer is in the act of praying; it is not an act to get something done, an economic act, but an act in the sense of an attempt at learning. We do not repeat informative, scientific statements once their import is sensed. But prayer, like sacrifice, is an attempt at reformulating old habits into new, developing a new level of moral

control and understanding, and as such its prime necessity, like that of sacrifice, is repetition.

Besides prayer, another way of perpetuating and extending the significance of sacrifice is in dress. Two essential elements of early Greek rites, Reinach tells us,[16] were "masquerade" and "adoption of a name." Thus the Albanian maidens who celebrated the worship of the Bear-Artemis, *dressed as*, and *called themselves*, she-bears. The Maenads, who sacrificed the fawn Pentheus, dressed themselves in the skins of fawns. The devotees of Bacchos took the name of Bacchoi. The arts of discourse and costume—"instrumental and consummatory" arts both—begin the process of extension of changed significances, meanings, responses gained in sacrificial rites to spheres of behavior not essentially religious.

Sacrifice is usually associated with suffering, pain, loss. That it is a loss we have seen, since all giving implies loss. But it is more than a loss of external goods; psychological attachments, familiar stimuli of beloved responses, are lost with them. Suffering arises from the detachment from old ways of response, especially from whatever pleasures may have been associated with them, and from the labor of learning totally new, unfamiliar ways and habits. In general, pain and suffering —whether physical, emotional, or spiritual—are functions of those situations in which the usual habits and methods of response of an individual are impeded, and adequate adjustment to the "cause" of the pain, that is, the new environment, is, by the nature of this environment, either extremely difficult or impossible. If suffering is itself an "adjustment," it is a substitute and a temporary one only; it is never accepted or durable in itself; it is instinctively avoided.

Certain people naïvely divide humankind into two groups: those who retire from life and seek peace, and those who enter upon life as on a public arena, and seek power. If this were true in all cases—and surely it is not, since peace and power each have their private and their public aspects, and there are not a few cases where they are sought, and found, in opposite directions—we could offer, as an inducement to the pious life, the thought that in religion both peace and power can be found. Recognizably religion gives peace—too deep and false a peace, say its detractors. But this is true only if music and the arts, the inspira-

16. *Orpheus* (New York, 1909), p. 83.

tion of the discovery of scientific truth, and the wisdom of life's direction are also deep and false. Yet religion also offers power, since control is power; and control comes easily when the moral ends of life, which give breadth, meaning, and insight to daily toil, are grasped by a mind that interprets them in action. If moral life profits, all pursuits profit, since height and depth of moral understanding become height and depth of philosophic, scientific, and artistic understanding. Genius and understanding do seem in a large sense to be transferable, in the same personality, to different realms of thought and action. Moral perspective is the integration, the unity, the *point d'appui* of all perspectives. Sacrifice, we have tried to show, is that kind of intensive *learning* which is a necessary condition for all attempts to extend the moral or religious horizon.

BOOK REVIEWS

Those Ancient Dramas Called Tragedies. By WILLIAM KELLY PRENTICE. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1942. 194 pp., with 2 plates. $2.50.

This is a series of descriptive and interpretative essays on a number of Greek dramas: Aeschylus' *Prometheus Bound* and *Oresteia*; Sophocles' *Antigone, Oedipus Tyrannus,* and *Philoctetes*; Euripides' *Alcestis, Medea, Iphigenia in Tauris,* and *Bacchae.* An initial chapter is called "The Origin of 'Tragedy.'"

The style of these essays is literary rather than academic, and gives the same refreshment as the language of another recent book by Professor Prentice, *The Ancient Greeks,* published by the Princeton University Press in 1940. In method also this book is unlabored, being a direct statement of the author's own feeling about the meanings and values of these plays, and assembling very few of the innumerable other interpretations that are now the burden of any scholastic approach. This method has dangers, but it at least prevents the writer and the reader from getting lost in the critical tradition; the danger of this simplicity is that the reader may not suspect that almost any statement one may make about the Greek theatre can be joined by variant theories about the idea in hand, and that an understanding of Greek drama rests on possibilities rather than certainties.

In approaching these plays, Professor Prentice indicates that some plays of this theatre must be studied or read with interest in their religious or mythological backgrounds, others must be taken as studies in character without any ritualistic derivations, while into some may be read the influence of social or political history. None of these interests is gone into very deeply, but there is a neat example of the mythological interest when Professor Prentice goes into the sources of the legends behind the *Oedipus Tyrannus* and emerges with a feeling that the motif of the mother-son marriage may be traceable to a nature myth of the marriage of mother-earth with a god of regeneration.

By the title of the book the author wishes to remind the reader that not all Greek tragedies are "tragedies" in the modern sense, that some of them have peaceful and mild endings, and that others seem to be melodramas:

> To the ancient Greeks tragos meant goat and aoide meant song. Thus tragoidia ought to mean the singing of the goats, and most scholars believe that

this word was applied first to choruses of men who, at certain festivals, dressed up like goats and danced and sang to please a god, known to the Greeks in the earliest times by various local names and later on called commonly Dionysus. . . . Moreover, as it was believed that it was this god who raised from the dead the plants which seemed to die each year . . . so it was believed that he had something to do with that resurrection of men after death in which the ancient Greeks believed, however vague and uncertain their conceptions of such a resurrection were (p. 3).

In this opening chapter there is also a swift outline of the development of the Greek theatre buildings, and a discussion of the emotional effects of this drama upon the audience. Professor Prentice makes a freeing and lucid interpretation of Aristotle's much debated statement that tragedy effects a purgation of the emotions: "But Aristotle can not mean that it is the function of tragedy to rid people of emotions such as pity and fear. He must mean cleansing whatever organs or mechanisms produce the emotions, and so increasing the flow of the emotions" (p. 7).

No one reading these and the other fluid thoughts of the opening pages would wish to be stopped for deliberations over counter-theories or exhaustive discussion; yet the mature reader will wonder whether some of the other supposed origins of tragedy should not be mentioned; whether Dionysus should be so loosely connected with the Greek idea of the after-life without any mention of Orphism, and whether this after-life should be called resurrection except in the faith of special cults; whether the meaning of Aristotle's phrase is not given too easy and slight an interpretation.

The chapter on the *Prometheus Bound* has a dramatic narrative of the plot; it is Professor Prentice's idea that this play is quite complete in itself and that one cannot escape a settlement of its meaning by pleading that the other plays of the trilogy are lost. Prometheus here is all that he needs to be to make a complete figure, and to show us that this play is about the battle of intelligence and forethought with the forces of disorder; the mind of Prometheus battles the lusts and foibles of the Olympians and shows the way of escape from these anthropomorphic and earthly divinities to a higher concept of the divine. This is certainly an appealing interpretation; one's only concern is with the idea that the gods shown in this play were "as repulsive to the thoughtful Greeks of the fifth century before Christ as they are to us."

It is by no means certain that many of the Greeks shared the puritan views of Plato and Professor Prentice; it is very possible that the ordinary Greek could make his own purifications of myths in his worship without destroying them in his imagination; the way in which today a Southern European can love, insult, scorn, and adore the same saint in adjacent moments may be a clue to earlier Greek and Roman attitudes. But Professor Prentice's main thesis here is guiding: this is a play that shows how the cosmos as well as the heart of man has grown from chaos toward a noble design.

The next chapter, on the *Agamemnon* is so compelling in the story of the play that one hesitates to regret that the author spends time restating and approving the interpretation of Verrall, whose struggles with this play seem an invented solution to an invented difficulty.

The *Agamemnon* contains some of the best theatre in the world, and probably there are endless ways to slant its lines to this or that meaning; Professor Prentice uses the red carpet laid for Agamemnon as a symbol of blood; another emphasis could slant the scene here, as all Clytemnestra's actions can be slanted, toward the attention of the chorus, who are the people she must live with after the king is dead; here the carpet may be spread to show the populace that their king has come home with oriental ideas of pomp and may be meant to rouse dread and suspicion in their hearts. Similarly, a little later, when Clytemnestra reappears, "The queen comes out again, and not unkindly tells Cassandra to follow her into the palace" (p. 32); perhaps the lines could be read as mildly as this; but this scene might be played as one of the most venomous moments in all drama, with Clytemnestra leaving her husband inside and risking the fall of her plot to kill him while she tries to abase in the eyes of the people this princess whose appearance in the train of the king has been an open insult to the queen; Clytemnestra suavely tries to reduce her to a slave of the household, and being thwarted by Cassandra's silence suffers her one great defeat in her own eyes and the eyes of the people.

But if Professor Prentice sometimes stays on the surface in his interpretation of Aeschylus, he saves us from endless confusions in the reading of Sophocles by warning us that Sophocles was not after solutions but situations, and that we should not debate the final rights and wrongs of these situations but pity or fear the complications arising from the conflict of strong and opposing personalities. In the discus-

sion of the *Antigone* the author wonders, as so many have done, at the meaning of the burial which Antigone gives her brother's body. A recent article, in the *Classical Journal* for June 1942 (pp. 515-26), by Edward J. Messemer, S.J., suggests that it is wrong to emphasize the comfort of Polynices' soul in Hades, as most critics here have done; rather we should see that in both the first and second burial Antigone is trying to save her brother's body from beasts and birds, and that no matter how many times the body is uncovered by enemies it must be buried again. This interpretation works nicely with the fact that it is the very exposure of the body to the birds which in the end pollutes the altars of the city and brings the anger of the gods.

The chapter on the *Philoctetes* describes that play as the maturing of Philoctetes, as the next chapter, on the *Alcestis* of Euripides, treats that drama as the picture of Admetus' growing up, at an inappropriately old age; the purpose of the *Medea* was to paint the results of selfishness. These plays, and the *Iphigenia in Tauris,* are outlined with swift narratives without any very long discussion, though the opening speech of Iphigenia is discussed at length, and the ending of the *Iphigenia in Tauris* is seen as an unclear bit of dramatic action.

The last chapter is on *The Bacchae*; there is an exposition of the plot, but its interior meaning is not exhaustively debated; the author rejects the idea that this play represents a contrast between faith and doubt, but he does not himself attempt to put a final illumination upon this puzzling drama; it would have been better to omit this chapter.

It is difficult to say for whom this volume was written; these essays will give help and pleasure to anyone entering on a study of Greek drama; they are not quite explicit enough to be entirely clear to one who knows nothing of this theatre in advance, and they do not seem to be directed to the scholar who knows these plays well and would come looking for solutions to fine points or the presentation of unobvious values discovered through labors of love and understanding. One regrets that Professor Prentice did not see fit to trust even the uninitiated with the largest ideas these dramas suggest; it would seem better to risk a lack of comprehension on the reader's part than to allow one to suppose that the reading of a Greek drama is anything but an extraordinary experience.

H. Theodric Westbrook

Scripps College

Spiritual Authority and Temporal Power in the Indian Government. By ANANDA K. COOMARASWAMY. New Haven, Connecticut: American Oriental Society, 1942. 87 pp. $1.75.

This detailed investigation into the roles of priest and king in the Indian theory of government should prove highly interesting, not only to students of history and social sciences for its Western parallels in antiquity and the Middle Ages, but particularly to students of religion, in so far as it lays bare the magic and mythical foundations of ancient traditional kingship as guided by spiritual authority. In doing so, it goes deep into Vedic mythology and offers new insights into the cryptic formulae and the style of ancient Indian religious thought.

Kingship and priesthood, according to the Indian concept, are linked to each other through the pattern of matrimony. The priest enacts the role of the male partner, the king is the "feminine" partner in the marriage of Sacerdotium and Regnum. Priest and King form a "syzygy" of conjoint principles, in which the priest is "put in front" (*purohita*), takes precedence of the bearer of secular power. Through the rite of "aspersion" (*abhiṣeka*), the king is not only enthroned, but brought forth, newborn from the initiatory death; he becomes "quickened" by the relation to the priest's spiritual authority, and he needs to be quickened by it in order to be successful in ruling by divine right. Priest and King form a progenitive pair; their mystic marriage produces the welfare of the realm; and only when this "marriage" is accomplished and lived out with the implications of authority and subservience appendant to both antagonistic co-operative functions, "the realm is guarded."

This syzygy of conjoint principles, however, is but an earthly reflex, an empirical instance of eternal relations on the divine, or cosmic plane. The highest, most comprehensive couple, Sky and Earth, is the archetype reflected in the pattern of human government; it is, at the same time, the model for the harmonious co-operation of many other couples of opposites, divine and earthly. Sacerdotium and Regnum, in their marriage relation, have many other equivalents in other contexts of Vedic thought.

This observation leads deeply into Vedic mythology; it opens up a new understanding of countless cryptic passages in the tradition of Vedic hymns and prose, when properly correlated and interpreted through each other. The principle of "syzygy," as observed in the theological theory of government, leads the author into a fascinating

analysis of divine pairs to whom it applies: Mitra and Varuṇa form a parallel syzygy of conjoint principles, they are Counsel (*kratu*, κράτος) and Power (*dakṣa*), Knower and Executive respectively; likewise are Agni and Bṛhaspati, the high-priests among the gods, the "male" partners of a matrimonial syzygy in which Indra, the king of the gods, represents the feminine part. "Counsel and Power" are the equivalents of Plato's essentials of good government, "philosophia and dynamis," and of the Islamic "Mercy and Majesty." Both, moreover, correspond to the silent, inaudible Brahman, the highest principle in and by itself, and to Vāc, Speech, the vocal revelation of divine wisdom, and to the Intellect that takes precedence of Voice.

It is difficult, indeed almost impossible, to do justice to this densely woven interpretation of Vedic thought as expressed through all kinds of syzygies; its outstanding value consists as much in the many lights it sheds on an enormous amount of cryptic details in Vedic thought and symbolism, dealt with in many dense notes, as in the extensive background of parallels and generalizations which link the subject to kindred traditions in antiquity (Egypt, Plato, Hermes Trismegistus) and the Middle Ages (Dante, St. Thomas Aquinas).

As to Vedic philology, the principle of syzygy, when applied to traditional pairs of gods and entities (e.g., melody [*sāman*] and word [*ṛc*], and the cantor [*udgātṛ*] and reciter, [*hotṛ*] respectively, forming progenitive pairs of a "male" and a "female") leads to a new understanding of the seemingly confused and confusing character of divine figures, of their fluid contours, their apparently fleeting substance. By being interchangeable as occupants of the same place, and in fulfilling the same function in the dual pattern of a mystic marriage, they allow for equations among each other which appear meaningless or arbitrary without reference to their functional identity. Thus Mitra and Varuṇa, the Two Ásvins, Sky and Earth, turn out to be not six different essences, but three aspects of one pair. To do justice to the highly speculative, symbolic character of the Vedic pantheon as handled by esoteric priestly thought, one must visualize the relations and functions of the energies and entities implied, instead of attempting to trace isolated personalities of an assembly of Olympians.

A further gain from Dr. Coomaraswamy's approach through a thorough comparative reading of passages from Vedic hymns and prose, based on a masterly command of the extensive sources, critical, flexible,

and minute, is the insight into the intrinsic unity of Vedic thought, from the archaic hymns down to the prose, somewhat less ancient as to grammar and style. In contrast to the rigid, isolating method of interpreting the hymn stratum of the *Rig Veda* exclusively through itself, the enormous matter of Vedic prose should be used as its earliest, most authentic, and comprehensive commentary. In studying the author's use of this prose, again and again, to make sense of esoteric, allusive, wilfully cryptic passages of the hymns, one feels inclined to wonder how the treasure of Vedic lore in prose could ever have been disregarded as the main help in understanding portions of the hymns which have had to be dismissed hitherto as unintelligible, or of negligible importance.

The principle of syzygies, affording the key to many esoteric equations between divine entities in Vedic speculation which baffled former scholars, shows its fundamental validity throughout the history of Indian tradition. It forms part of the basic structure and articulation of late Hindu religion of the Tantric period, with its pairs of gods and their female energies (*śakti*), as well as accounting for many riddles and intricacies of Vedic mythology. Within the limits of his investigation, Coomaraswamy deals only with the application of this principle to the basic concepts of man's nature (*adhyātmam*) in the Upanishads. The relationship of man's two Selves, the psycho-physical Ego, subject to passions and sufferings, and the Spiritual Person, the "higher" Self, contemplative and serene, reflects the same universal pattern. Both compare to an Outer King and an Inner Sage or Priest. The two Selves, on the microcosmic scale correspond to the divine pairs analyzed before, to the two natures of Brahman, transcendent-silent, and, revealed-manifested as speech-tradition, to the spheres of transcendent eternal truth and of transient active reality (*satya* and *anṛta* respectively), as both are impersonated in the social sphere by the representatives of the sacerdotal and the kingly principle. The supreme peace and well-being through wisdom which should be achieved in man's nature, is brought about by the consummation of a perfect marriage-relation of both Selves, a state which, in the political realm, is attained through the harmonious co-operation of priest and king in their respective functions, thanks to the "victory over the powers of perception and action" in the king's nature, i.e., through the victory of the Inner Priest over the Outer King in the monarch's character.

Another characteristic and highly effective trait in Coomaraswamy's approach to Vedic thought is his distinctly "realistic" attitude (in the scholastic meaning of this term), his Platonic or non-nominalistic viewpoint, contrary to the prevalent nominalistic perspective of modern man and science. The actual syzygies on the divine and earthly plane make sense when understood as reflecting and embodying the principle of a perennial relationship, as do, according to the "realistic" theory, the empirical data in reflecting transcendent entities or perennial ideas. Leaving aside the insoluble issue as to the relative values of the conflicting "realistic" and "nominalistic," or idealistic and empiric viewpoints, one gains the impression from Coomaraswamy's investigation that the "realistic" view applied to the matter of Vedic thought has definite advantages. It makes sense of the many cryptic traits in the very web and woof of the ancient, highly speculative metaphysics of the Vedas; it proves more fruitful for establishing the intrinsic unity of thought and the deep and lofty purport of the Vedic theologians' comments on their gods and rituals than any previous attempt at interpreting the same matter on unconsciously nominalistic lines. The "realistic" approach appears to be more in harmony with the style of Vedic thinking, and the intrinsically idealistic attitude of Indian esoteric thought in general; it is akin to it in structure and procedure. Through it, with Coomaraswamy, the trend of Vedic thought is analyzed and retraced as if "from within." In this respect, this essay, taken together with his earlier papers on Indian ideas and symbols, opens up a new and stimulating phase of Vedic studies, and of a more intimate understanding of Indian thought in general, based as it is on philological criticism, sympathetic intuition, and an astounding command of the material available far and wide.

HENRY R. ZIMMER

Columbia University

The Social Background of the Old Testament. By DAVID JACOBSON. Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1942. xi + 327 pp. $2.00.

The Bible Is Human. A Study in Secular History. By LOUIS WALLIS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942. xvi + 330 pp. $2.50.

Much of the speculation of the higher critics of the Bible has passed into the limbo of forgotten theory; a good deal because of its prioristic

character, some because it required impossible emendation of the Masoretic text, and some because later evidence amassed by archeologists and ethnologists has disproved it. The critics have, however, left their mark on the students who followed them, even though their specific theories are disregarded. It is to the work of the higher critics that we are indebted for an attitude vastly important in such works as those of Wallis and Jacobson, which we are considering here. This attitude is one that permits of what Wallis calls "the secular study of the Bible," which I would take to mean the study of the Bible not as divinely revealed religious truth, but as humanly written information about the history, sociology, and economics of the Hebrew and related peoples in biblical times. Such studies neither negate nor intend to deny the religious values of the Bible; they are, one might say, a second reading of the Bible for purposes other than those of advancing the cause of religion.

Dr. Jacobson's *Social Background of the Old Testament* is most clearly an example of this attitude, because the author, a rabbi, is undoubtedly concerned with the Bible from the point of view of religion, but this concern does not appear in this book. Here he is attempting, with the aid of the biblical text, of the researches of anthropology and ethnology, and of the excavations of archeology, to reconstruct hypothetically the social framework within which the life of Bible times was lived. So he discusses whether the society was patrilinear or matrilinear, the nature of marriage and the family, the relation between the individual and the group, beliefs about the dead, the possible origin of biblical monotheism in ancestor worship, theories of blood kinship and the use of blood in sacrifice, blood revenge, the levirate, and circumcision. Thus he covers the major headings in the sociology of the Bible.

Dr. Jacobson's conclusions are these: the society out of which the Bible arose was probably patrilinear. Its marriage customs reveal a general trend from polygyny to monogamy; barrenness, however, was at all times a legitimate reason for divorce or for polygyny; the function, therefore, of marriage was the production of offspring. The marriage of either ortho-cousins or cross-cousins was common, possibly for economic reasons. There are some evidences for the existence of a family cultus coexistent with Yahweh religion; this would make intelligible the position of the wife in the family, in a lower category than the mother, a possession, but of a rank higher than that of slaves; it

would also rationalize the absolute parental authority of the father and the conditional authority of the mother. This would also explain the status of the *Ger* as a person with a temporary family standing, and that of the slave as a more permanent addition to the lowest rank of the family, since, where there is a family cultus, non-membership in a family group amounts to exclusion from all humanity. Thus the group is more important than the individual.

There is evidence for pre-Yahwistic ancestor worship; the idea of deity may have arisen out of such a pattern, or the deity may have originally been conceived as family ancestor. Dr. Jacobson believes that a king-cult preceded the Yahwistic stage, that the progression was from a divine king to a royal divinity. The sacrificial rites tend to evidence ancestor worship, since all sacrifice reduces to blood sacrifice, which is sacrifice to the ancestors. So, too, blood revenge, which was subjected to a gradual ethicizing among the Hebrews, would tend to reveal an ancestral cult. The Levirate obligation seems in some way to be tied up with a cult of the dead, based upon the dominant Hebrew drive for carrying on the name, rather than to be of economic origin as among other Semitic peoples.

Many of the details which are presented by Dr. Jacobson are of deep interest, apart from their use as documentation for the conclusions of the author. So, for example, Dr. Morgenstern's illuminating distinction between *mishpahot* and *shebatim* clarifies the meaning of several biblical passages, e.g., Lev. 19:20, and throws light on the entire book of Ruth, and, to that extent, on the putative background of King David. A book of interpretation like this can, however, be no better than its sources, and in this respect Dr. Jacobson's judgment is not always good. He seems quite taken with the views of J. D. Unwin, and presents, (pp. 178-80) in his notes to the fifth chapter a summary of Unwin's classification of societies on the combined basis of treatment of the dead and sexual behavior. Unwin's theory is a beautiful example of the type of thinking warned against by Ruth Benedict, in her *Patterns of Culture,* namely, the imposition of conceptions arising out of our society upon societies of a different tradition. The weaknesses of Unwin's theories shed light on Dr. Jacobson's critical insight, although it is possible to sympathize with his desire as a religious leader to accept a thesis which seems to point to our morality as an end toward which cultural history has long been directed.

Despite these strictures, Dr. Jacobson's book is worthwhile as a review of a good deal of the monograph literature in the field, and as a suggestive outline of the sociology of the Bible period.

Superficially similar in theme is Dr. Wallis' *The Bible is Human,* though in effect it is at the opposite pole. It comes as the third of a series of books (the first, *A Sociological Study of the Bible* was published in 1912) presenting the justification, and the outcomes of the author's primary and radical intuition that the historic order suggested by the German higher critics for the source documents of the Old Testament is erroneous. Wallis presented as his view the theory that the Elohistic or Ephraimite source preceded in order of composition the Yahwistic or Judaic source.

His hypothesis has been extraordinarily fruitful, as those who have read his earlier books will recall. In *The Bible is Human,* the author's passionate espousal of his views carries the reader along in willing acceptance of the implications of the revised theory of the sources, and of the necessary rewriting of Hebrew history. That this rewriting would be an extreme blow to the traditional position can be readily seen from the treatment accorded to the Moses cycle. The cultural-figure of Moses, says our author, is built up on

> the sanguinary prophetic figure of the actual, historic, Ephraimite *nabi* (prophet) Elijah, who in ritual practise means more to the Jewish tradition than Moses himself. . . . If there was in the pre-Canaanite period of Israel some inconspicuous person to whom the impressive priestly tradition of *Mosheh* ultimately attached itself, we have no means of rescuing such a figure from under the superincumbent mass of conflicting data in the Hebrew Bible (pp. 263-64).

The fundamental hypothesis which necessitates and, in the author's mind, justifies so radical a reorientation of the traditional point of view, is that the entire Judaic revision of the Bible was motivated by the desire of the dominant priestly class in the Southern Kingdom to obliterate the memory of the earlier period in which the local shrines of the Ephraimite complex were the centers of the Yahweh cult.

The failure of the Judaic revisers completely to achieve their objective has left many hinting contradictions in the Bible story which have led Wallis to his position. To this reviewer, they lead to a suggestive rather than a conclusive argument. Further archeological studies may, perhaps, provide proof of the details of the process which Wallis pre-

sents as Hebrew history; these studies may, perhaps, support the traditional viewpoint. Textual study and criticism of the Bible cannot, at this time, be considered as leading to any sure results.

Wallis' work must be taken as a brilliant minority position. No future attempt at the reconstruction of Hebrew history can be complete without taking it into consideration.

Joseph L. Blau

Far Rockaway, New York

Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research. Vol. xi (1941). New York, 1941. xxi + 163 pp.

This well edited volume, a worthy heir to its predecessors, consists of six papers which, though chiefly concerned with research in problems of Judaism, branch out into other scholarly fields as well, thus bearing eloquent testimony to the universality of scholarship.

The first paper (pp. 1-25), by Dr. Fritz Bamberger, deals with the conception of history of that eminent Jewish scholar, Leopold Zunz, who is known as the founder of the science of Judaism. Dr. Bamberger is above all interested in tracing the philosophic elements and background of Zunz's science. He rejects the harsh criticism leveled against Zunz by both Cohen and Graetz, who saw in him only an antiquarian. He furthermore traces Zunz's training and studies and finds (p. 2) that "underlying Zunz's work there are systematic intentions, broad perspectives and universal philosophic schemes." Even in Zunz's later works there are traces of the philosophic ideology which characterizes his early contributions. Zunz's conception of history is a blend of the philosophy of history, as expounded by the "Historical School" and its principal exponent Savigny, and the teachings of Friedrich August Wolf or Humboldt. Though some of his contemporaries fell under the spell of Hegel, the latter's influence on Zunz is hardly noticeable. As a whole, Zunz was the first to apply modern historical principles and methods to Judaism and thus brought about a completely new approach which Dr. Bamberger terms not "secularization," but "historization."

The second contribution, by Dr. Israel Efros, discusses some aspects of Jehudah Halevi's mysticism (pp. 27-41). Both on metaphysical and epistemological grounds Halevi was definitely opposed to Arabic ra-

tionalism. He sought for something more congenial to his Jewish teaching as an avenue of escape, and found it in Muslim mysticism.

In the third, the shortest essay in the volume (pp. 43-46), Dr. Michael Higger calls attention to two passages in the Yerushalmi which assume that R. Hoshaiah was the author of the Tosefta.

The fourth contribution, "Alexander the Great and the Indian Gymnosophists in Hebrew Tradition" (pp. 47-83), by Dr. Luitpold Wallach, will appeal to classical, medieval, and Semitic scholars alike. Dr. Wallach's purpose is to elucidate the relations between the Talmudic Alexander traditions and the Alexander Romance. After a detailed examination of the source material, the author demonstrates the existence of three varieties of the Alexander legend in Jewish literature. The first (and oldest) type comprises legends in which Alexander appears as the universal sovereign, to whom nations appealed as an abitrator in settling their differences. The existence of this type reveals that the memory of Alexander was kept alive among Jews and appealed to their imagination, and it is to that memory of the great king that the origin of the first type is attributed. The second type of the Alexander legend is of a derivatory character, with sources traceable to Pseudo-Callisthenes, while the legends of the third type either go back to Pseudo-Callisthenes or to one of the translations based on his text.

For the study of Jewish life and manners in the Roman Empire during the third century A.D., the paintings in the synagogue, unearthed at Dura-Europos by the Rostovtzeff expedition, are of great importance, for they prove among other things the use of pictorial representations by the Jews. The identification and interpretation of some of the paintings is still a subject of controversy. In an ably written paper, "The Samuel Cycle in the Wall Decoration of the Synagogue at Dura-Europos" (pp. 85-103), which will be appreciated by classical archeologists and biblical scholars, Mrs. Rachel Wischnitzer-Bernstein (formerly of the Jewish Museum, Berlin), takes issue with du Mesnil du Buisson's interpretation of the paintings, set up in three registers on the walls of the synagogue's main chamber. Hers is an attempt "to analyse a group of panels and to find out whether they are meant to convey any specific ideas and images beyond their literal sense" (p. 86). In the reviewer's opinion, the author successfully disposes of some of du Mesnil's conjectures and tentative interpretations with arguments that show both scholarly insight and competence. Her conclusion merits quotation:

the right part of the middle register sets forth the idea of the *Institution of the Kingdom,* or in terms of the actual situation, carries the expectations of the triumph over the tribulations of the times, and the corresponding part of the lower register means to convey the idea of the *Investiture and the Restoration of David.* Thus both sets of pictures are logically connected, complete each other and convey through biblical images the messianic expectations of the Jewish community (p. 101).

The volume closes with Professor Harry Austryn Wolfson's "Hallevi and Maimonides on Design, Chance and Necessity" (pp. 105-63). Those interested in philosophy in general, and in ancient and medieval philosophy in particular, ought not to miss this learned and well documented study.

The volume is well printed, but lacks one feature to which some thought ought to be given. An index would certainly enhance its value.

JACOB HAMMER

Hunter College
New York City

Parakletoi. Vorstellungen von Fürsprechern für die Menschen vor Gott in der alttestamentlichen Religion, im spätjudentum und Urchristentum. By NILS JOHANSSON. (Inauguraldissertation). Lund: Håkan Ohlssons Boktryckeri, 1940. xiv + 323 pp.

Theology is no longer the queen of the "sciences," but she is still a powerful princess and has a great many faithful and gifted servants. She also makes use of one class of scholars of whom her rivals, Anthropology, Psychology, and Sociology have made only occasional use, namely the philologists. While the newer disciples have given most of their attention, as is natural and proper, to the beliefs and customs of prehistoric, savage, infantile, and abnormal types of men, Theology serenely continues to study almost exclusively the beliefs and practices of the historic religions. She is too proud (her critics would say that she is secretly too fearful) to submit herself to a clinical examination at the hands of social scientists, while the social scientists are either too contemptuous of Theology, or too fearful of the hostile attitude of her still powerful supporters, to invite her to submit to such an examination. In this state of truce, that benevolent neutral, the philologist, is willing to do what he can to make the beliefs of the historic religions

clearer both to the faithful and the skeptics. Of course the philologist may be, and usually is, a believer, but he does not usually allow his belief to influence his judgment in interpreting the language and institutions of the religion which he studies. Such a conscientious philologist is the author of the work here reviewed.

The term *parakletos* is one to make a philologist rub his hands with pedantic, or shall we say, more appreciatively, with virtuosic glee, because it is a magnet to which many meanings have become attached in the Jewish-Christian tradition, such as advocate, spokesman, interpreter, intercessor, mediator, comforter, helper. Johansson, who is a pupil of Odeberg, Eidem, and several other eminent Scandinavian scholars, has studied these various meanings separately and in combination. For the benefit of philologically competent theologians he has transcribed the relevant texts in Hebrew, Ethiopic, Syriac, Aramaic, and Greek, and for the benefit of a larger circle he has provided these texts with a careful translation. He has been equally conscientious and skilful in dealing with the history of the ideas involved in the Paraclete-Complex, and has shown good judgment in his appraisal of recent theological literature on the subject. The reviewer, therefore, must at the outset express his opinion that the book is a model of scholarship and interpretation in almost every respect. The only general criticisms he would make are of a minor nature, namely that the author has not furnished an index of technical terms and key subjects, and has not taken into account some important works, such as those of G. F. Moore, Bonsirven, and Louis Ginzberg. More specific criticisms will be given below.

The three main divisions of the book deal with the concept of the Advocate (*Fürsprecher*) in (1) the Old Testament, (2) Early Postbiblical Judaism, (3) Early Christianity. Part I has five sections: (1) Men of God and Prophets as Intercessors, (2) Angels as Advocates of Men, (3) The Intercessor as Witness, Guide and Mediator, (4) Concepts of the Advocate and the 'Ebed YHWH Poems. Part II has three sections: (5) Concepts of the Advocate in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha with the Exception of the Ethiopic Enoch, (6) Concepts of the Advocate in the Ethiopic Enoch, (7) Concepts of the Advocate in 3rd (Hebrew) Enoch, the Midrash and Talmud. Part III has four sections: (8) The son of Man as Advocate (with subsections on the various aspects of the Paraclete-complex), (9) The Spirit as Advocate (espe-

cially in the Johannine writings), (10) Angels as Advocates, (11) The Origin of the Early Christian Conceptions of the Advocate (with subsections on parallels in Mandaic and Philonic writings, a study of the word *parakletos* in gentile Greek, and a summary of the conclusions reached regarding the meaning of the term in Jewish and Christian tradition).

In what follows the reviewer will comment only on the passages that seem to him most important or original or controversial. The book is so systematically arranged, and the author's own conclusions are so clearly stated that there seems no need for the reviewer to summarize the book in his own words. It should be clear from this synopsis that Johansson's work is of great importance for the understanding of the essential character of early Christian theology.

The author begins by showing that in the Israelite religion intercession by prayer is a function, not of the ordinary pious person, but of the "man of God" and the prophet. Moses is a normative example of this type. Against Von Rad's view (*ZAW*, 1933) that intercession was the peculiar office of the cult-prophets, Johansson argues that the cult-prophet's chief business was to give oracles, and cites Jer. 27:18 as evidence for his own view (p. 20). Less convincing, though still plausible, is Johansson's treatment of the intercessory passages in Job 16:19-22, 19:25-27, 33:23-28. He disregards the fact that at least one of these passages reflects a point of view not altogether consistent with that of the book as a whole; nor is he wholly successful, in the reviewer's opinion, in solving the problem of who Job's vindicator (*goel*) in heaven is (pp. 24 ff.).

Excellent is the discussion (pp. 37 ff.) of the origin of the belief in angels as mediators or intercessors. Reviewing the theories of Mowinckel and Bousset, who favor a Mesopotamian-Persian origin for the Jewish patron-angels and archangels, Johansson more plausibly argues that the later Jewish belief arises naturally from earlier Israelite notions about the mediatory role of chosen men of god, and that such notions may have been extended to the angels before the introduction of eschatological ideas which were admittedly influenced to some extent by Persian beliefs.

The section on the Advocate as witness, guide and mediator is appropriately introduced by a discussion of the Hebrew root *p-l-l* of which the reflexive form *hithpallel* is usually rendered "to pray." In op-

position to leading Hebrew lexicographers, Johansson convincingly argues that there is no need to separate *p-l-l* into two distinct roots, one ("intensive" form) meaning "to give a priestly decision" and the other (reflexive form) "to pray for," since meaning 2 can be derived from meaning 1; that is, from the meaning "to make a decision" we can derive the reflexive form's meaning "to make oneself a priestly judge," hence "to pray for" or "to intercede for." Johansson is clearly right in attributing to *hithpallel,* as used in the prophetic writings, Deuteronomy and Chronicles, the meaning "to pray for." Moreover, the intercessor also exercises the office of witness, corrector, advisor, etc., as in I Sam. 12:23 and Isa. 43:27. Thus the associated words *'ed, meliṣ* and *pallel* all have juristic meanings among others.

Important also is the section (pp. 53 ff.) on the Advocate in the *'Ebed YHWH* poems in Second-Isaiah. Johansson, partly following Mowinckel, connects Isa. 42:1-4 with Job 4:10 ff. and 33:14-17, and develops the theory that "Israel's *meliṣim* [roughly "spokesmen"], the men of God, the prophets, and above all the angelic Advocates, were the formal prototypes of the *'Ebed YHWH* figure; cf. Isa. 53:12. In this connection the reviewer must confess that he is prepared to revise his own view, expressed some years ago in an article in *HTR* (1937), that Isa. 53 is different in character from the other *'Ebed YHWH* passages (a view shared, the reviewer learns from the present work, by Lindblom), since Johansson's interpretation of Second-Isaiah's use of the word *meliṣ* makes it seem probable that Isa. 53 belongs in essence to the same school of thought. Incidentally, the author does well to point out (p. 58) that the idea of vicarious atonement is at least as early as the time of the composition of Deuteronomy. The author's interpretation of the *'Ebed YHWH* passages is on the same high level as his treatment of the Advocate passages in the Old Testament as a whole.

In Part II, which draws on the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha, Johansson's linguistic knowledge shows to best advantage, for here he has to deal in detail with Ethiopic, Aramaic, and late Hebrew texts. The passages he cites from the postbiblical literature seem to support his contention that there was a gradual change in the Jewish conception of the Advocate. In the Old Testament, he states, Moses and the prophets were regarded as intercessors whose chief purpose it was to deflect the wrath of God from Israel. In the later literature their office is less juristic and more restricted to procuring God's blessing for Israel

and Israel's triumph over enemies. Moreover, to men of God and prophets as Advocates (spokesmen, intercessors, etc.) later Judaism adds priests, scribes, and pious individuals generally. The reviewer here would raise the question whether Johansson has been altogether successful in separating the idea of the high priest as the agent of communal atonement by sacrifice from the high priest as Advocate. A similar query arises in respect of the office of martyrs. However, the author's general argument seems quite sound.

Any discussion of the Advocate-complex in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha must concern itself largely with angels. Most students of theology are well acquainted with the mediatory role of Michael, Raphael, and other angels in Baruch, Tobit and other books of the Intertestamental period. But the author here raises, or rather, recurs to the problem whether in most cases the angel in question is a representative of the divine attribute of Mercy as opposed to the attribute of Justice, or merely a passive agent of God. He concludes that the weight of evidence favors the view that these angelic Advocates never oppose the will of God but merely act in accordance with his will, as in later Christianity. Another fact that supports the latter view is that angels are accusers as well as defenders of men in the Apocryphal literature, *kategoroi* as well as *synegoroi.*

One of the most original parts of the whole work is the discussion (pp. 84 ff.) of the Spirit as Advocate (in its various senses). Johansson finds that in Wis. Sol. 1:6-8 Sophia (here = the spirit of God) has some of the functions that the *melişim* have in the Old Testament. She is guide, reprover, and mediator. In dealing with the Spirit of Truth (*pneuma tes aletheias*) in Test. Judah, Johansson opposes Mowinckel's view that the concept is influenced by the Persian concept of *asha.* Here, as in the case of Mowinckel's assumption that the twofold nature of the Persian *daena* (roughly "conscience," as the reviewer's teacher A. V. Williams Jackson used to render it) has influenced the twofold concept of the angels as defenders and accusors, the author seems to be right in explaining the variations and splittings of meaning as natural developments within the sphere of Israelite religion, though he does not deny that this development may have been shaped or directed in part by outside influences, chiefly Persian.

Quite properly the author devotes special attention to the book of Enoch (unfortunately preserved only in the secondary Greek and

tertiary Ethiopic texts), since this book was of prime importance in shaping the early Christian doctrine of the Messiah. Johansson doubts the validity of the Billerbeck-Jeremias hypothesis that in the early rabbinic period there was a circle of believers in a supernatural suffering savior, represented by the Son of Man (*Barnasha*) in Enoch. The author does not deny that there is a similarity between Second-Isaiah's Suffering Servant and Enoch's Son of Man, but he repeats the objection to the theory earlier made by Sjöberg, namely that the latter is a living judge and Advocate, not a dead or suffering Savior.

In the following chapter, on the Advocate in rabbinic Judaism, Johansson has occasion to deal at length with the enigmatic figure of Metatron, and is admittedly influenced in his theories by the well-known work of Odeberg on the Hebrew (3rd) Enoch. The author seems to accept Odeberg's etymology of the name Metatron as *meta thronon*. This etymology seems quite impossible to the reviewer, who hopes to deal with the problem in a separate article some time in the future. Here he will only remark that all the evidence is in favor of the theory, held by George Foot Moore among others, that the true source of the name is the Latin *metator*; but the important fact is that this Latin etymology merely serves as a focus for various Heracleitian-Philonic-Gnostic ideas of which the early history remains to be traced. Equally impossible is Bonsirven's similar etymology (not mentioned by Johansson) of *metathronos*, "sharing the throne of God." Such a meaning could never have been expressed by this particular compound in any kind of intelligible Greek. The reviewer is also inclined to question the rather early date assigned to the Hebrew Enoch by the author on the basis of Odeberg's work.

The passages chosen from the Hebrew Enoch are arranged to show Metatron's various offices as: (1) Guide, (2) Witness, Judge, Advocate and Prosecutor, (3) Intercessor, (4) Priest in the heavenly tabernacle. The author correctly points out that normative rabbinic Judaism, in contrast to mystic and Kabbalistic Judaism, gradually allowed the prominence of the Metatron figure to be dimmed because of the possible danger to the purity of monotheistic belief, and partly because of opposition to certain tendencies in Christianity. Nevertheless, as Johansson remarks, the Advocate concepts found in the Hebrew Enoch are very helpful for an understanding of Christian ideas of the Mediator. The author also points out that the Torah concept largely as-

sumed Metatron's function as Guide, and that the opposition to anything remotely approaching a cult of Metatron would naturally be reinforced by the general rabbinic tendency to discourage a cult of angels, to which the masses seemed to be inclined. These assertions seem to the reviewer well substantiated by the passages cited by the author from the Talmud and Midrash. The most frequently mentioned mediators and advocates in rabbinic literature are the patriarchs and Moses, especially the latter.

In his study of the Advocate-complex in early Christianity, the author naturally begins with the concept of the Son of Man, and accepts the now familiar theory, built up by several scholars in the last few decades, that the Gospels combine the concept of the Son of Man in Daniel and Enoch with that of the Suffering Servant in Second-Isaiah. In this connection Johansson remarks that it is probable that the Palestinian contemporaries of Jesus were accustomed to read several apocalyptic and Wisdom books that the Rabbis later on allowed to be forgotten because of the use made of them by proselytizing Christians. This theory is not new but is worth repeating.

The reviewer is not quite certain that he has wholly understood the argument (pp. 187 ff.) concerning the relation of the Son of Man's function as Guide to the other functions of the Advocate; but one point which is clear and, at the same time, important and plausible is that the Son of Man is not a Guide to all men but only to a chosen few. This point will be discussed below.

Against Baur, who stresses the gnostic affinities of the concept of Jesus as "the way" in John 14:1-6, Johansson argues that it is not necessary to go outside Judaism for parallels to this concept, and cites similar ideas from the Enoch literature. But the query may be raised whether the author is right in assuming that the Enoch literature has been unaffected by gnostic speculation. The reviewer believes that a strong case might be made for the theory that both the Gospel of John and the Enoch literature, particularly 3rd Enoch, have been influenced by gnosticism. But unfortunately it is extremely difficult to prove such a theory even to one's own satisfaction.

A particularly important point in the author's discussion of the Advocate-concept in the Gospels is the theory that Jesus' activity as Guide consisted principally of initiating the chosen group of disciples into the Mystery of the Kingdom (*to mysterion tes basileias*). Johansson in-

sists that nowhere in the Gospels is there any indication that the disciples participate in Jesus' mediatory suffering and that, in this respect, the Gospels are to be contrasted with Paul's views. The author finds that the Gospel attitude is reflected in other writings of early Christianity, and that here too "discipleship (*Nachfolge*) is essentially a community of suffering (*Leidensgemeinschaft*) with Christ and participation in the salvation brought by him" (pp. 209-16). Unless the reviewer has badly misunderstood this section, there appears to be a puzzling contradiction in the author's interpretation of these ideas. At any rate, it will be of interest to report his further conclusion (p. 221) that

> we are therefore justified in proposing the following thesis: *Jüngerschaft* and *Nachfolge* is *(sic)* a very unified concept in early Christianity. This is oriented purely religiously [that is, not ethically]. It is part of the activity of the Advocate. According to the unanimous testimony of the Gospel tradition this meant for Jesus' disciples: (1) a gradual introduction into the secret of the Kingdom of God, (2) a community of suffering with the Son of Man, which in the belief of Jesus was to be realized in full in the period between his death and resurrection and his *Parousia,* (3) participation in the activity of the Son of Man as Advocate, and in his intercession and atoning death.

As regards the activity of the Advocate as Witness, Johansson remarks that this aspect is subordinated to the others in early Christian theology, for the simple reason that Jesus himself was conceived as judge. A further study of the occurrence of the words *martys, martyrein,* etc. as listed in the *Theologisches Wörterbuch* seems to show that there was only a loose connection between the Witness concept and the Advocate concept in early Christian writings, but Johansson believes, in opposition to Strathmann, that there is such a connection in the 'Ebed YHWH passages, and that this is reflected in the New Testament (*e.g.,* John 15-26).

The discussion of the Advocate as Intercessor centers largely about the use of the phrase *en onomati Iesou* and leads to the conclusion that in this aspect Jesus largely assumes the role elsewhere assigned to angels.

More central to the whole problem of early Christian theology is the long chapter (pp. 235-55) on the Son of Man as Mediator. Johansson begins by recognizing that many religions have had the idea that worshippers may appease the wrath of a god by making a sin-offering or giving ransom. He then points out that what is peculiar to Old Testa-

ment religion is the fact that early in Israelite thought this primitive belief was attached to the juristically conceived belief that the worshipper might have a religiously sanctioned spokesman, or a witness before God's judgment-seat, or a guide to instruct him in God's ways, thus producing the Advocate concept in its various juristic-religious aspects, which were then further combined with the concept of the Suffering Servant in Second-Isaiah. It was this complex which the early Christian theologians had at their disposal as a framework into which they could fit their concept of Jesus as the savior of sinful mankind. From this basis Johansson explores the later development of Hebrew *kopher,* "payment of ransom" and "atonement," into the New Testament *lytron* with a broadening of the cultic-juristic meaning into a wider term connoting sacrifice, sanctification, and other theological ideas. The reviewer, while agreeing with the substance of the author's argument in this section (pp. 239-44) is inclined to regard some of his conclusions as speculative rather than demonstrative, for example, his statement that the theological implications of the Last Supper indicate a progressive adaptation to the Jewish cult-meal and a gradual and imperceptible weakening of the original close connection with the Christus mystery, and that Paul, the Fourth Gospel, and the Introduction to Mark in this respect represent an older, pre-judaizing tradition. In the reviewer's opinion it is more probable that an original Jewish paschal tradition of the Last Supper was partly hellenized by Paul and the Fourth Gospel. The reviewer would not, however, seriously question Johansson's theory that Paul, too, was influenced by the Suffering Servant concept of Second Isaiah in presenting his doctrine of the vicarious atonement.

The author admits that there is some truth in Deissmann's contention that such passages as Rom. 14:7-9 and Gal. 2:19-20 are allusions to the sacral manumission of slaves in antiquity, that is, the notion that Jesus freed the believer from spiritual slavery and so acquired him as his property. But Johansson insists that that the idea of Jesus' followers belonging to him by right of the vicarious atonement is chiefly dependent on the concept of Jesus as Advocate and is pre-Pauline. Paul, he thinks, restated the idea in hellenistic mystical-legal terms. In short, the Pauline conception of the redemption is a fusion of cultic-legalistic and mystical beliefs.

Equally interesting is the chapter (pp. 256-74) on the Spirit as Ad-

vocate. The author examines in detail that Johannine passages on the Paraclete, such as John 14:16-17, 25-26; 15:26; 16:7-15; I John 2:1-2, and reviews the literature on these passages, stressing as particularly important Mowinckel's essay, *Die Vorstellungen des Spätjudentums vom heiligen Geist als Fürsprecher und der johanneische Paraklet.* Johansson believes that these passages contribute nothing significantly new to the Advocate concept, but deserve special study chiefly because they show more clearly than other passages the transition from the idea of the Son of Man as Advocate to that of the Spirit as Advocate. In this connection he shows that *aletheia* in the Johannine writings means "Christian revelation," and that the Paraclete continues Jesus' work of guiding the disciples and teaching them the "mystery," as he had done in the capacity of Advocate. Johansson further believes that the Johannine passages on the Paraclete are based on authentic sayings of Jesus, since such a conception is rooted in Judaism.

The reviewer regrets that the excessive length of this report prevents him from considering here some details in the remaining sections of the book that are almost of as great interest as the preceding. A brief restatement of the author's own summary must suffice, namely that the Advocate concepts of early Christian theology are a development of earlier Jewish beliefs. Just as the Israelite concept of the Advocate is distinguished from that found in primitive religions by being a fusion of cultic, juristic, and moral beliefs, especially under the influence of prophetic teaching, so the early Christian concept of the Advocate is distinguished from the Jewish chiefly by combining the functions of the various types of Advocate (patriarchs, prophets, angels, Spirit, etc.) and identifying the unified complex with the historic personality of Jesus.

RALPH MARCUS

Jewish Institute of Religion and Columbia University

Jesus in the Light of History. By A. T. OLMSTEAD. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942. xiv + 317 pp. $2.75.

New Testament science has been immeasurably enriched by the contributions of specialists in other fields who have illumined New Testament problems from the wealth of their technical knowledge; it is accordingly a delight to welcome Dr. Olmstead, an Orientalist of

high distinction, to the ranks of such scholars as Julius Wellhausen, Friedrich Blass, Eduard Meyer, W. M. Ramsay, and Dr. C. C. Torrey. To be sure, the essential results of his work may suggest superficially a mere return to the older "liberal" portrait of Jesus, with the Messianic and apocalyptic elements discarded, but a closer study reveals contentions which, if accepted, will revolutionize Gospel research.

In the matter of chronology, to begin with, Dr. Olmstead holds that absolute precision is attained. By using the tables very recently published by Dr. W. H. Dubberstein and Dr. R. A. Parker, *Babylonian Chronology, 625 B.C.-46 A.D.*, he sets the Crucifixion definitely on Friday, April 7, A.D. 30. And, by computing from the synagogue lectionary of the period, the beginning of Jesus' ministry as described in Luke 4:16-30 fell on Saturday, December 18, A.D. 28; this ministry consequently lasted exactly 475 days!

The Jewish background is reconstructed radically. Thus far it has been assumed unquestionably that the scribes whom Jesus encountered were normally Pharisees; Dr. Olmstead, on the contrary, maintains that they were without exception Sadducees; in every case where Pharisees are bracketed with scribes or others later interpolation has been at work. The Sadducees were the strict literalists, and "some years before the public ministry of Jesus the 'lawyers' among these scribes had composed a new law code . . . called the Book of Decrees" (p. 182). Against the ruthless demands of this code the Pharisees protested; "the laws ascribed to Moses were relics of a barbarous age, and must be mitigated to fit the conditions of a more civilized era" (p. 184). But this mitigation involved distortion of the plain letter of the Law, so Jesus went further, not being "interested in the Law as such," treating it "only as the first step in a development which culminates in his own commands, . . . it is just in what Jesus *added* to the Law of Moses that we must seek his true greatness" (p. 185).

Dr. Olmstead supports his conclusions further by a source criticism of the Gospels that is unique. As he sees things, the oldest and most reliable source is incorporated in the Gospel of John, a source written less than a decade after the Crucifixion. The exact limits of this source he does not define, but holds that portions of it have been lost, while in the present Gospel it has been enlarged by the editor's "long-winded sermons." In comparison the historical portions of the Synoptic tradition are of lesser worth, although much of the Synoptic

moral teaching and the parables are of primary value. For instance, the "almost despairing cry of Peter" in John 6:68-69 is authentic, a cry that is "far indeed" from "the triumphant recognition of Jesus' messiahship assigned him by the other and later biographers" (p. 141). Just so, the denunciation of Judas in John 6:70 is original, but the transfer of this denunciation to Peter in Mark 8:33 is a "libel," to which Luke replies in 22:31.

A constant danger that besets scientists working in any field is the temptation to assume the infallibility of results achieved in the past; to feel that fresh progress can be made only along "received" lines. Gospel research, therefore, owes a debt of gratitude to Dr. Olmstead for the entirely fresh point of view he has brought to the subject; he may be assured that his contentions will be received with great respect, and that his conclusions will be analyzed with the same sincerity that characterizes his own work. Such an analysis, however, obviously cannot be undertaken here; it will demand the contributions of specialists in many fields. But a weakness of his treatment seems apparent in his source-criticism. When, for example, he treats the account in John 5:1-18 as of substantially primary value (pp. 156 ff.), he overlooks the fact that the thesis of this story does not lie in the healing miracle, but in the man's carrying home his pallet on the Sabbath; not an act of mercy, but needless physical labor is the point; the Sabbath law is not graciously interpreted but totally repealed. In other words, John sets forth a controversy impossible in Jesus's ministry; his account presupposes full Paulinism carried through unsparingly. Or, again, John 2:1-11 is something much more than "a charming idyll, no doubt improved by memory" (p. 64); it is a piece of anti-gnostic polemic, whose meaning is revealed by, e.g., I Timothy 4:1-5. And when Dr. Olmstead writes that John 7:42 is "incontravertible evidence" that the narrative was written before A.D. 40 (p. 159; cf. p. 256), very few students of the Fourth Gospel will agree with him; compare, e.g., Dr. Bultmann's comments on this passage.

Until Dr. Olmstead sets out the principles of his Synoptic criticism in greater detail, appreciative evaluation of his method is impossible. Synoptic research today is generally agreed, for instance, on the very secondary and "programmatic" character of Luke 4:16-30, which Dr. Olmstead treats as completely authentic as it stands. And, in the matter of the chronology, can his assumption of a fixed festal calendar be rec-

onciled with the Mishnic evidence of *Rosh ha-Shanah*? Its tradition is clear and unambiguous; the new moons which determine the other feasts were not computed in advance, but were determined by direct observation in each case.

BURTON SCOTT EASTON

General Theological Seminary
New York City

Coleridge and the Broad Church Movement: Studies in S. T. Coleridge, Dr. Arnold of Rugby, J. C. Hare, Thomas Carlyle, and F. D. Maurice. By CHARLES R. SANDERS. Durham: Duke University Press, 1942. vii + 307 pp. $3.50.

Anyone who has tried to distinguish the essential elements of the Broad Church movement will read with enjoyment and profit this latest study of Broad Church thought. Professor Sanders is thoroughly at home in the Victorian world which witnessed the growth of those tendencies of thought whose fusion produced the complex liberalism of such men as Coleridge and Maurice. The result is a book which should be of interest to students of early Victorian literature, religion, and philosophy.

Professor Sanders recognizes the difficulty of defining exactly what it was that the members of the Broad Church movement (as contrasted with party) had in common. In an introductory chapter he reviews the many attempts made since Maurice's time to differentiate the Broad Church from other movements within Anglicanism. In some of these attempts the Broad Church has been defined so as to include the whole liberal movement within the Anglican Church; in others it has been limited to include only those who like Maurice were liberals of a special kind. The author suggests that much of the confusion which has appeared in discussions of the Broad Church has been due to a failure to distinguish between two major groups of liberal Anglicans: the one group closely associated with Oxford, predominantly Aristotelian in thought, and, in general, hostile to tradition and church authority; the other group associated primarily with Cambridge, Platonic in thought, and, while lauding progress, reverent of the past and its institutions. Copleston, Whately, Hampden, the two Arnolds, Baden Powell, and Jowett were representative of the first group; Coleridge,

Hare, Sterling, Maurice, and Kingsley of the second. Professor Sanders believes the Coleridgeans were more directly in line with and responsible for Broad Church thought, and, except for the chapter on Thomas Arnold, his book deals primarily with this group.

The author's conception of Broad Church thought is given in the opening sentences of his Introduction. "In Coleridge's teaching," he states, "there is a highly significant effort to reconcile love of freedom with love of truth and a persistent desire for unity—intellectual, social, and religious. The purpose of this book is to understand that effort and the influences it had on four other men" (p. 3). The index bears striking testimony to the fact that the topics freedom, truth, and unity are repeatedly treated together throughout the book. Admittedly the effort to achieve unity and freedom by searching for the true principles on which these must rest was characteristic of Coleridge, Hare, Maurice, and others in the Broad Church current of thought. Professor Sanders is correct about this, as he also is about Coleridge's influence on these men. It cannot be overlooked, however, that when he includes Arnold, as is necessary in any study of the Broad Church movement, the limitations of the author's conception of Broad Church thought become apparent. For Arnold does not fit into the current of thought which characterized the followers of Coleridge.

Arnold's thought differed from that of the Coleridgean group in several important respects. Coleridgean Broad Churchmen, for example, resisted all attempts to limit investigation, because they held agreement concerning what is true a prior necessity to attaining the unity they desired. The truth which was the ultimate object of their search was in its essence spiritual, and they maintained that knowledge of such truth was not only possible but was the root and condition of all other knowledge. "Any basis of fellowship but a Theological one," Maurice stated, "must be narrow and exclusive" (*Theological Essays*, p. 445). Continued theological investigation was essential, therefore, if men were to discover the truth in which all sects, classes, and opposing philosophies might rest securely. In contrast, Arnold denied that agreement concerning what is true was a necessary prerequisite for religious, social, or intellectual unity. Coleridge had declared, Professor Sanders tells us, that he who begins by loving Christianity better than truth "will proceed by loving his own sect or church better than Christianity, and end in loving himself better than all" (p. 32). For Arnold, however, "Chris-

tian doctrine was to be tested, not for its truth, but for its 'efficacy as a means of moral good' " (p. 119). So, too, Arnold wrote respecting social unity, the end of all societies "whether we call them states or churches . . . should be good rather than truth" (p. 118). Nor did Arnold fully subscribe to the central principle of Coleridgean metaphysics—the confidence in the reason, by which the Coleridgeans meant a power enabling men to know spiritual truth and not limited by conditions of space and time. Instead, Arnold stressed the understanding, the power enabling men to weigh intellectual propositions, which the Coleridgeans to a considerable degree minimized in order to make room for an expanded conception of the reason.

These differences in outlook indicate the difficulties of trying to confine Broad Church thought within a Coleridgean framework. For obviously Arnold's influence was significant in the development of Broad Church thought, and the Aristotelian emphases he gave Broad Church thinking must be incorporated in any satisfactory conception of the movement as a whole. One can, to be sure, find agreements between Arnold and Coleridge, and Professor Sanders does. "Thus, in the main," he writes, "Arnold agreed with Coleridge in emphasizing the importance of understanding the past; in looking for the philosophical implications of history; in insisting that the principles thus discovered were of value only when they were brought to bear on the present and future; in welcoming progress when it destroyed only what was worthless in the old; in attempting to reconcile the welfare of the individual with that of the group; and of opposing all forces which threatened or ignored the welfare of either" (p. 111). But these agreements can no more be termed the distinguishing criteria of Broad Churchism than can the teachings of Coleridge; many non-Anglican liberals and even some Tractarians would have claimed adherence to the same principles. In brief, Professor Sanders has given detailed consideration to a significant element of Broad Church thought, but once again the Broad Church movement, in all its fullness, has eluded definition.

Inevitably readers of a book dealing with ideas will differ with the author on some points of interpretation. Professor Sander's treatment of the distinction made by Coleridge between the reason and the understanding is a case in point. He states, "Like Kant, Coleridge distinguished between two aspects of the reason . . . the speculative or theoretical reason and the practical reason" (p. 47). But he fails to

note, except indirectly in a minor footnote (*ibid.*), that Coleridge was confused in his own thinking in this connection, and that Coleridge's use of the practical reason indicates that his concept was the direct opposite of Kant's. For, though Coleridge accepted Kant's limitation of the understanding (the speculative reason) to the phenomenal world, he would not accept as only an assumption the noumenal world. Nor would he admit that man could possess no higher *knowledge* than that permitted him by the phenomenal world. It is evident that such a metaphysics repudiated the core of Kant's philosophy. Kant had emphasized that even though men might create an *ideal* of something more adequate than the scientific realm they had found, the realm of scientific experience was the realm of knowledge. The assumptions of science made the world intelligible; he respected science as the real source of knowledge. In Coleridge's philosophy, however, scientific knowledge or knowledge by understanding, was disparaged in order to exalt the *knowledge* which came through the reason.

In like manner, to this reviewer Professor Sander's analysis of Coleridge's conservatism and liberalism seems uncritical. "The liberal," we are told, "keeps his mind free to accept or reject things regardless of their dates. Hence Coleridge was, in spite of his reverence for the past, a genuine liberal who refused to let his mind be bound by conceptions of the time" (p. 57). Actually, Coleridge was unduly influenced by the fact of Establishment. He sacrificed religious and moral insight to historic development. His social philosophy illustrates this. Portraying the *status quo* as the embodiment of an unfolding idea, his political theory tended to sanctify, despite the class divisions hated by him, the prevailing institutional life of society. Nowhere in his writings, for example, does Coleridge consider any possible change in the basic institutional life of society. Established institutions are accepted. Nowhere does he explain just how the possession of property gives the sufficiency of judgment requisite to the exercise of political right. Yet he opposed popular suffrage on the grounds that "that government [is] the best, which, in the exactest ratio, makes each man's power proportionate to his property," and insisted that "artificial power must be . . . balanced against physical power; and when the physical strength of the nation is in the poor, the government must be in the hands of the rich" (*Essays on His Own Times,* Vol. II, p. 331). Had he been asked why he equated the possession of property and the exercise of political power,

he might have repeated his statement, made in another connection, "I am firmly persuaded that no doctrine was ever widely diffused among various nations through successive ages and under different religions . . . which is not founded either in the nature of things or in the necessities of our nature" (*Literary Remains*, Vol. I, p. 322). A truly historic view would have taken into account the constant change exhibited in social life. Instead, like all conservative patriots, he tended to revere unduly the institutions of a single nation at a particular period. The historical process was lost sight of and conservatism triumphed.

The foregoing criticisms are not to be construed as strictures on the book as a whole. Professor Sanders has done an excellent piece of research. In an appendix he states that the value of Coleridge's thought "has been questioned as frequently as his character as a man" (p. 265). This study should do much to dispel such questioning. To scholars interested in studying Coleridge's influence on Maurice, who is often considered the founder of the Broad Church movement, the book is indispensable. Certainly, too, the last chapter, "Maurice and the Church Universal," will interest all who today feel a deep concern for the ecumenical movement.

The book has an unusually complete index which makes cross-reference reading a pleasure. The nineteen page bibliography will assist scholars particularly interested in the period, although one will note that such excellent studies of Coleridge as R. J. White's organization of his political writings and Alfred Cobban's comparison of Coleridge and Burke are not included.

CYRIL K. GLOYN

Pacific University

Fear and Trembling; A Dialectical Lyric. By JOHANNES DE SILENTIO (SØREN KIERKEGAARD). Translated with an introduction and notes by WALTER LOWRIE. Princeton University Press, 1941. xxix + 209 pp. $2.75.

Repetition; An Essay in Experimental Psychology. By CONSTANTINE CONSTANTIUS (SØREN KIERKEGAARD). Translated with an introduction and notes by WALTER LOWRIE, with a bibliographical essay: "How Kierkegaard Got into English." Princeton University Press, 1941. xlii + 212 pp. $2.75.

The Sickness Unto Death; a Christian Psychological Exposition for Edification and Awakening. By ANTI-CLIMACUS (SØREN KIERKEGAARD). Translated with an introduction and notes by WALTER LOWRIE. Princeton University Press, 1941. xix + 231 pp. $2.75.

A Short Life of Kierkegaard. By WALTER LOWRIE, Princeton University Press, 1942. 271 pp. $2.75.*

Fear and Trembling and *Repetition* were both written in Berlin during May and June 1843. A year and half had gone by since Kierkegaard had broken his engagement with Regina Olsen, and he had written *Either/Or* and *Three Edifying Discourses* in the interim. His attempts to convince her of the impossibility of going through with the marriage had failed, until he finally resorted to the painful device of pretending he was a scoundrel who had been toying with her affections. But he was still undergoing a struggle between resignation and hope. On the one hand, he was convinced that his own isolated and "heterogeneous" nature would destroy her; on the other hand, he longed to be able to look to her for salvation. When he returned to Copenhagen in July 1843 he discovered that she was engaged to Fritz Schlegel, and then Kierkegaard was bitterly dismayed. In fact, the conclusion of *Repetition* had to be re-written in view of the sardonic turn of events.

Abraham's sacrifice of Isaac, which furnishes the main theme of *Fear and Trembling,* stands for S. K.'s own act of renunciation. Yet he represents the pseudonymous author, Johannes de Silentio, as occupying a lower plane from which he can marvel at Abraham's faith without being able to attain it. This reflects Kierkegaard's own conviction that if he had possessed sufficient faith he could have gone through with the marriage, since faith stands beyond resignation and enables one to accept "the finite." Consequently he attacks the assumption that reason goes beyond faith and is superior to it. He says, in effect, "Take a good look first at what faith involves. Ask whether you have achieved it, or whether a whole life of strenuous spiritual endeavor suffices to achieve it. Then and then only, may you consider 'going beyond' it; and then you will know that you cannot go beyond it."

In depicting Abraham on Mt. Moriah as the epitome of the man of

* The *Philosophical Fragments* and the *Concluding Unscientific Postcript* by Søren Kierkegaard were reviewed in the January 1943 issue of the *Review of Religion,* pp. 143-62.

faith, the author has him turn away for a moment just before raising the knife over Isaac. In that moment, Abraham's face takes on a wild and horrible look, and he tells Isaac that the sacrifice is his own murderous desire instead of God's will. He does this because it is better for Isaac to think his father a monster than to lose faith in God. The parallel between Abraham's painful device and Kierkegaard's is clear. Abraham, however, is represented as one who has always steadfastly believed, even after the belief has become unreasonable; he did so in connection with Isaac's birth; he does so now when God is apparently about to nullify all His promises.

The author brings out the entirely hidden and subjective character of faith by calling attention to the fact that if Abraham had doubted and had merely gone through a pretense in preparing the sacrifice, everything would have been the same so far as externals are concerned. It is the *way* Abraham underwent the trial that is important. Either he was a (potential) murderer or he was a man of faith; and unless he loved Isaac, the whole affair was only a base temptation. If Abraham had engaged in an act of heroic resignation, that would have been perfectly understandable; what defies comprehension is the manner in which he passes through resignation and, instead of losing the finite and the temporal, regains them on the other side.

This contrast between "the knight of infinite resignation" and "the knight of faith" is drawn in various ways, and it underlies the three "problemata" which occupy the latter half of the book. The first problem raises the question: "Is there such a thing as a teleological suspension of the ethical?" In other words, may the individual's absolute relationship with God stand higher than the universal demands of ethics? Other instances are cited where parents have been called upon to sacrifice their children (Agamemnon and Iphigenia, Jephtha and his daughter, Brutus and his son), but these all differ from Abraham and Isaac, because they are acts performed from a social motive which meets with ethical approval. Abraham's action is purely personal and seems to be immoral. It cannot be justified by the result, because the whole significance of the action turns upon the character of the decision which precedes the result. Before the result, Abraham was either a murderer or a believer, either a violator of the ethical or one whose faith transcended the ethical.

The second problem therefore asks: "Is there such a thing as an absolute duty toward God?" If so, it makes the ethical relative, but with-

out abolishing the latter. Ordinarily when we see a man doing something which does not conform to the universal demands of ethics, we assume that he is doing it selfishly and in defiance of the will of God. In faith, what looks like individual defiance of the ethical is joined with absolute devotion to God. The difference between unethical selfishness and individual faith is clear, however; for, in the latter case, all of the universal values of ethics have been affirmed, attachments to family and friends are fully cherished, and yet they are made subordinate to an absolute duty. Everyone recognizes the importance of making the transition from the selfish to the universal, but ordinarily no attention is paid to the transition from the ethical to faith, where the individual comes back at a new level in aloneness before God.

The third problem asks: "Was Abraham ethically defensible in keeping silent about his purpose?" Here Kierkegaard is dealing, under a cloak of indirection, with his own problem in connection with the engagement, and he is also giving expression to his conviction that faith is not directly communicable. Several examples are employed to illustrate the relative ethical merits of concealment and self-revelation. The story of Agnes and the Merman parallels Kierkegaard's feelings about his own affair. Because Agnes trusts the Merman, he cannot bring himself to seduce her, and yet it is only as a prey that she could become his. Consequently a struggle takes place within the Merman between giving himself wholly to repentance and taking Agnes. Kierkegaard's sense of isolation also comes out in connection with other instances where cursed, deformed, or demoniacal people cannot be saved by universal principles. They are either doomed to despair, or they are saved by faith.

Fear and Trembling is one of the most remarkable of Kierkegaard's books, because of the boundless inventitives with which Old Testament stories, myths, and other literary materials are woven into a pattern of serious argument and indirect personal confession. Many of his recurrent themes appear here in an especially intense and vivid manner: the relationship between aesthetic immediacy, ethics and faith; the inwardness, incommunicability, and "absurdity" of faith. Not until later in his writings do we see these themes brought specifically into connection with Christian conceptions of sin and salvation.

Repetition also reflects the agitation and excessive introspection through which Kierkegaard passed as a result of the broken engage-

ment. Dr. Lowrie's introduction gives an account of the philosophical significance of the work, and of the manner in which it was misinterpreted by Professor Heiberg, a contemporary of the author. Kierkegaard's bitter reply to Heiberg, from which Dr. Lowrie quotes, explains how the philosophical import of the book is deliberately veiled. S. K. seeks to let the category of repetition grow out of concrete events and situations, instead of setting it forth in abstract principles—1, 2, 3—like the Hegelians. There remains, however, a maddening discrepancy between this explanation and the actual contents of the book. In the explanation, repetition is defined as "the highest interest of freedom," standing beyond pleasure and shrewdness. We are told that "the true repetition is eternity," and that its religious meaning is atonement. Kierkegaard attacks the Hegelian system, as he does in the *Postscript* and elsewhere, because it tries to introduce "motion" into logic, whereas "mediation cannot be employed at all in the sphere of freedom, where the next thing constantly emerges, not by virtue of immanence but of transcendence" (*Repetition,* p. xxix). Thus, with Dr. Lowrie's help, the reader is enabled to see that *Repetition* and *Fear and Trembling* deal with the same philosophical theme, as well as with the same personal catastrophe. In the *Concept of Dread,* which was published a year later, Kierkegaard appends a footnote wherein "repetition" is shown to be identical with that new life which comes only as a transcendant gift; it comes in the leap of faith which stands beyond the universal demands of ethics. In other words, when Abraham has everything restored to him, in virtue of the absurd, after he has renounced and lost it, that is a "repetition."

Perhaps these remarks are sufficient to indicate that *Repetition* is a puzzling book. No one who has merely cursory interest in Kierkegaard will feel that understanding the volume is worth the effort involved. Yet, unless they have done the necessary spade-work, very few readers will be able to see that in the opening pages, where repetition and recollection ("anamnesis") are described as "the same movement, only in opposite directions" (p. 3), the former involves that return to the finite and willingness to abide in it which characterize the "knight of faith" in *Fear and Trembling.*

The "plot" of *Repetition* can be summarized very briefly. Its pseudonymous author, Constantine Constantius, is the confidant of a young man who is in love; the attachment is a tormenting one, because what

the young man really loves is his own poetic muse which the girl has awakened in him. Since it would be despicable to let her know the truth, and since the young lady is so maddeningly faithful that she will not release him herself, Constantine Constantius suggests an arrangement with a seamstress whereby the youth will seem to be a scoundrel; but the youth cannot go through with it. The pseudonymous author is represented as a detached observer who is sufficiently acute to realize that one must get beyond the aesthetic category of "the interesting," but not sufficiently passionate to reach the level of religious faith. He makes a trip to Berlin in the hope that repetition will be possible; but although many amusing things happen to him, the experiment is a failure.

In justice to the book it must be said that if one pays no attention at all to its recondite philosophical meaning, he will find much of it highly diverting. The description of Constantius' journey is hilarious, and his accounts of the theatre and of life in Berlin at the time are also entertaining. Perhaps two or three sentences gleaned at random will indicate the liveliness of Kierkegaard's wit: "Great is the fidelity of women, especially when it is declined" (p. 25); "When I am talking German I am the most compliant person in the world" (p. 39); ". . . the whole city (Berlin) was one cloud of dust. I thought at first that it was all arranged by the government" (p. 40).

In the second half of the book the young man reappears as a correspondent. He has fled to Stockholm whence he bombards Constantine Constantius with letters which reflect (very skilfully) the resentment of a suffering man toward a calm observer. At the beginning of the correspondence, which is strictly a one-way affair, since the young man withholds his address from Constantine, he examines his own motives for running away from the situation, indulges in a good deal of bitterness about the girl, and tells of his present misery. Gradually he gets consolation through identification with Job, who "received everything *double*" (p. 132). In the last letter he has learned that the girl has married someone else. He declares that this turn of events has solved his problem, and that she has acted magnanimously in forgetting him completely. His life has been restored to him and he, like Job, has received everything double.

In a concluding communication to the reader Constantine Constantius drops some hints concerning the religious significance of repeti-

tion, especially in connection with those individuals who are exceptions to the universal.

The essay entitled "How Kierkegaard Got into English," which Dr. Lowrie appends to this volume, is a useful guide to the translations and studies which have appeared in the past half-dozen years. Although students of philosophy and theology must be grateful to the various translators and publishers who have participated, it is certainly unfortunate that the translations could not have appeared under a single editorship in a uniform edition.

The *Sickness Unto Death* was written in 1848. Thus it belongs to Kierkegaard's most productive period as a religious writer. With such works as *Christian Discourses, The Point of View, Training in Christianity,* and *For Self-Examination,* it comes after those turning points in his development which are represented by the *Postscript* and his "Easter experience" of 1848. Whereas in *Fear and Trembling* and *Repetition* the pseudonymous authors stand below the religious level, Kierkegaard is now directing his energies explicitly toward "introducing Christianity into Christendom," though he still writes as one "having no authority." He employs a new pseudonym, for reasons which Dr. Lowrie has explained in his biography; but he abandons all attempts at "indirect communication" and addresses himself straightforwardly to the task of describing what Christianity involves. Kierkegaard went through a long period of indecision in connection with publishing several of these religious writings, because he knew that they would be construed as a vicious attack upon the Church; thus they might bring persecution and prevent him from entering either the pastorate or teaching at a time when he was in serious financial difficulties. Moreover, he was aware of the fact that his version of Christianity was so severe that it lay beyond his own attainments, and he was reticent about seeming to impose burdens upon others which he had not yet learned to carry himself.

The *Sickness Unto Death* anticipates many of the principles of depth-psychology, and it works them out in organic connection with a profound interpretation of their theological significance. The possibilities of a "Christian therapeutic" which Kierkegaard here envisions have not yet been adequately investigated even today.

The sickness unto death is despair. It has nothing to do with physical

illness and mortality, over which Christianity stands triumphant; its locus is in the spirit, the self. Whereas the natural man shudders at earthly misfortunes which do not dismay the Christian at all, he remains ignorant of what is really most to be dreaded. The Christian acquires his "good courage" concerning mundane and temporal matters only because he knows of a much more dreadful evil.

The self is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, the eternal and the temporal, freedom and necessity. Because man is not self-sufficient, and because he can achieve selfhood only by relating himself aright to God, he falls into despair whenever the self is alienated from its Ground. This manifests itself in two fundamental ways: (a) Despair at not willing to be oneself; (b) Despair at willing to be oneself. (A third form, despair at not being conscious of having a self, falls below the reflective level.)

Man in despair usually regards himself as a victim of external circumstances; but if he recognizes that the trouble is internal, then he only intensifies his predicament if he tries to cure himself. The only cure is "willing to be oneself as grounded in God." Because despair is a disease of the spirit, and lies in the sphere of responsibility, the *possibility* of it is linked with man's superiority over the beasts; nevertheless, the concrete *actuality* of it is perdition. In other words, man's spirituality is both a blessing and a curse. Unlike a physical illness, despair does not continue as a matter of course once it is contracted; it is "being contracted" in every instant, with the self as its cause; for it is related to the eternal in man.

Usually, therefore, people do not literally die of despair; on the contrary, it involves the torment of not being able to die. Its hopelessness consists of being deprived of the last hope—death. Christians know that death is not the end of the matter, and man's eternity is proven by the fact that he can continually consume himself in despair without succeeding in getting rid of the self.

Despair is universal, and we should not be deceived by those persons who declare that they are in a sound spiritual condition. The most complacent people are those who are least aware of their own difficulties; their health and security are fictitious. When disaster comes along and plunges them into despondency, we are not to assume that everything has been serene up to that moment; what happens is that a despair which has been there all along, despite the individual's un-

consciousness of it, has come to the surface. Such a catastrophe may be salutary if it leads to a cure; but it is perilous if one does not want to be cured. One who without affectation acknowledges that he is in despair is a step nearer being cured than one who is unconscious of it.

After this preliminary statement of the problem, the author proceeds to analyze despair under various categories. It may help at this point to give a resume of his scheme of classification, as follows:

1. Despair viewed in terms of the factors in the synthesis of selfhood
   (a) Finitude/infinitude
   (b) Possibility/necessity
2. Viewed under the aspect of consciousness
   (a) Unconscious
   (b) Conscious

Under the last category, conscious despair, appear the two fundamental forms of despair at not willing to be oneself, and despair at willing to be oneself.

1. (a) Since the self is a synthesis of finitude and infinitude, despair arises when either factor gets out of equilibrium. The despair of "infinitude" manifests itself in fantasy. Here the role of imagination is fundamental, and it can affect every aspect of experience. Fantastic feeling takes the form of abstract sentimentality about mankind in general and forgetfulness of concrete individuals. Fantastic knowledge involves endless expansion of erudition as an escape. Fantastic willing attaches itself to lofty purposes and resolutions which have become detached from the fulfillment of concrete conditions in daily tasks. The fantastic individual is *isolated* from both the real world and the real self. A genuine relationship to God is impossible for him, because God destroys our illusions of being infinite, and denies us the fantasies after which we yearn. It goes without saying that a man can be fantastic in these ways and still conduct his life so that he appears to himself and others to be perfectly normal and happy.

The despair of "finitude" manifests itself in narrowmindedness and spiritual meanness. A man becomes a dead-level conformist; he loses his individuality in fear of conventions. Many primitive elements enter into a man's real constitution, and finitude submerges them completely instead of simply disciplining them. The resulting despair goes unnoticed because the person is compliant, successfully "adjusted" to con-

ventions, and wise in the ways of the world. As Kierkegaard trenchantly puts it, worldliness is made up of successful men who are not themselves.

1. (b) The despair of "possibility" arises when one has become detached from the necessary conditions involved in all spiritual progress. The individual who constantly toys with imagined possibilities, and forgets his personal limitations, never matures; in modern psychological parlance, he becomes a case of arrested development. Sometimes his fantasies take the wishful form of yearning for something he could never accomplish; in other instances they take the melancholy form of being so preoccupied with dreadful possibilities that the individual is paralyzed.

The despair of "necessity" issues either in fatalism or in philistinism. Fatalism means dumb submission and spiritual suffocation. The philistine lives in a trivial province within the bounds of "ordinary possibilities"; hence he is spiritless. He cannot cope with reality because it transcends his parrot-wisdom and platitudes. Thinking that he has mastered life, he is impotent before possibilities higher than those he has envisioned. The only real remedy for this despair of necessity comes at the point where, so far as human resources are concerned, the individual is completely enslaved. Then the question is whether he can have faith in God, for Whom all things are possible. This faith involves acceptance of one's own destruction (i.e., death to the enslaved self); then, instead of succumbing, the individual receives divine help—perhaps by withdrawal of the terror which has enslaved him, perhaps by means of the terror.

2. (a) "Unconscious" despair can occur because most men do not regard facing the truth as the highest good. Instead, they want to keep their illusions. When a man is really unhappy but imagines he is happy, he regards anyone who shatters his illusions as a spiteful enemy, a killjoy. Sometimes men deceive themselves by judging everything in terms of sensuous categories—the agreeable and the disagreeable; but there are those at the speculative level who also deceive themselves by erecting a vast metaphysical system which embraces the whole of reality but has nothing to do with life; the philosopher then clings to his illusions for the sake of retaining the system. In a sense, ignorance may be bliss; but in another sense, one who is unconscious of his despair is in the worst predicament of all, because he is farthest from achieving spirituality. Unconsciousness of despair is of course very common; the

pagan and the natural man may be quite happy from an aesthetic point of view, but, without belittling the humanistic achievements of paganism, Kierkegaard insists that it falls short of consciousness of the self as grounded in God. He makes an interesting distinction, however, between pure paganism and paganism within Christendom; the former is oriented in the direction of spirit, the latter *away* from spirit; the former is innocence, the latter apostasy.

The author acknowledges that a distinction between unconscious and conscious despair is too abstract; most frequently there are various levels of clarity and obscurity. A man may be right in thinking that he is in despair, without having an adequate conception of its cause; hence the greatest possible clarity about himself is called for, although complete clarity and despair may be mutually exclusive. When things are going well, we regard despair as evoked sporadically by circumstances, instead of realizing that it is constant and internal; we assume that everything can be remedied by changing the circumstances, or we seek to bury ourselves in work, diversions, etc. As increasing reflectiveness shifts the attention from external to internal factors, despair becomes more intense unless some remedy intervenes.

2. (b) The two fundamental forms of "conscious" despair—not willing to be oneself, and willing to be oneself—may be called, for the sake of brevity, "weakness" and "defiance"; each keeps the other alive.

The despair of weakness can attach itself to either the earthly or the eternal. Despair over the earthly means enslavement to outward circumstances. A man sees himself as just one temporal thing among others; hence his wishes, enjoyments, and aspirations are all "this-worldly." He thinks in terms of the agreeable and disagreeable, of fortune and misfortune. Since all disaster seems to come from external happenings, his only recourse is to have fortunate events recur. Thus he looks upon himself as at the mercy of circumstances, and fails to realize that the real root of his despair comes from having lost the eternal in himself. He learns nothing through suffering, since he only wants to get it over with instead of becoming a self through it. It is easy for such a man to wish to be someone else; since he has a self only by means of externals, he assumes that everything could be remedied by altering the externals. When reflection intervenes, and the individual begins to recognize that his troubles originate in his own defects instead of in the environment, he gets frightened. He becomes aware of a new and more difficult prob-

lem; but he now feels that he is a passive victim of his own defects. Accordingly, he must stake his hopes on a change for the better within himself. He dares "come to himself" only occasionally--to see whether a change has occurred yet. If it has, he "is himself again"; if it has not, he veers away from further reflection and tries to forget the problem. He then thinks about "that time when he was in despair," without realizing that his evasion has left him worse off than before.

This despair over something earthly, with a trace of self-reflection, is the commonest type. Thorough reflection is rare. Those who start approaching it usually run away, because becoming spirit seems to be a waste of time; most of their fellows attach very little importance to it. Hence they dismiss their despair as a youthful phase which they have now fortunately outgrown, when really it was the best and most sensitive period of their lives; and in veering away from it—"settling down" —they have reverted to something more childish. They become the sort of grown men and women who have as many illusions as children, only more encrusted and rigid ones. To assume that despair is peculiar to youth is to assume that faith, wisdom, and spiritual depth come as a matter of course, like second teeth and a beard. One never automatically achieves spirit, though it is very easy to run away from achieving it, losing one's capacity for passion and imagination amidst the mediocrity and somberness of middle age.

Despair over the earthly is the obverse side of despair about the eternal. A man can ascribe absolute importance to the earthly only when he has given up hope of finding anything higher. This also means despair over himself, since the self has something of the eternal in it. Such a man is much more conscious of what despair really is, for it is loss of the eternal and of oneself; and just because his despair is more intense, salvation is in a sense nearer. The wound of reflection has gone too deep to be cured by forgetfulness. This reflective despair is rare, and it leads to the introverted personality. The introvert has contempt for those who cannot tolerate the necessity for self-control, and he takes pride in his own repression. He needs solitude, instead of constant feeding on gregariousness. (He finds it laughable that, in our society, the only use we can find for solitude is to punish criminals.) He thinks that most preachers talk rot, but he is afraid of being led too far by the few who do not. This introversion is really pride as a cloak over his weakness. When it becomes intolerable it leads to faith, or

madness, or externalized relief through distractions such as great undertakings and sensuality. (Sensuality is a desperate attempt to return to immediacy.) If the introversion is absolutely maintained suicide is an imminent danger.

The second fundamental form of conscious despair is willing to be oneself—"defiance." The defiant man abuses the eternal in himself by trying to overcome finiteness and necessity "on his own power," in detachment from God. He is not content to begin with what he has to work with, because that is finite and imperfect. By sheer will-power he wants to make a direct transition to unlimited freedom and perfection. He is an atheist, because he proposes to create himself according to his own specifications. The *active* form of this defiance lacks seriousness; inasmuch as the individual has no judge over him, he is irresponsible, and there is no firmness in his character; in any instant he can destroy everything he has posited and revolt absolutely. Hence all his magnificent feats of will-power are built on sand. The *passive* form of defiance is one in which the individual is unwilling to hope that earthly distress, the temporal cross, will be removed. He accepts this transitory suffering, as it were, eternally. Such hopelessness gives rise to hatred of life itself and a determination to be oneself despite it. The individual defiantly wills to be himself with his torment, but without any hope of salvation. And it is false to assume that such a person will gladly accept help from God or from another man. He wants help, but on his own terms. He does not want the humiliation of having to accept it unconditionally. He clutches his torment, because it gives him the right to be resentful, and he rages at the thought of a salvation which might remove these. He thinks that he himself is sufficient proof that life is cruel, and thus he wills to be himself—clutching his misery.

The second part of the volume carries the analysis forward from a psychological to a theological level. The gradations from unconsciousness up to a consciousness of something eternal in the self have all been given thus far from a standpoint where "man is the measure." When the self is seen as standing before God, a new qualification is introduced. Sin *before God* is to be in despair at not willing to be oneself or at willing to be oneself.

The greatness of human spirituality lies in the fact that God is both the criterion of selfhood and its goal, and He remains such even when men, in sin, cease to acknowledge Him. The pagan and the natural

man have only human standards; hence they are in a sense unconscious of their sin; they are "innocent," except that their light-minded interpretation of life covers over a despairing unawareness of existing before God. Christianity may deepen not only one's awareness of sin, but one's actual sinning, because it is so severe that one rebels against it; yet in giving a deeper apprehension it opens the way to a cure.

To define sin in terms of despair may seem to leave out theft, murder, adultery, etc. But these spring from despair, and even if one succeeds in avoiding them his whole life may still be in sin,—for before God secret wishes and thoughts, not merely overt acts, are laid bare. The opposite of sin is not "virtue," as paganism held, but faith; faith means that the self, in willing to be itself, is grounded in God.

People are offended at Christianity because its goal would make man something so extraordinary that he is not able to get it into his head. It is silly to defend Christianity by trying to take away the offense. Christianity teaches that the individual is invited to live in fellowship with God, and that for this individual's sake God came into the world, suffered and died. Whosoever has not the humble courage to believe this must be offended by it. But his offense is unhappy admiration, akin to envy; he calls Christianity stupid and queer, because he is afraid that fate might make a mockery of him if he were to believe in the miraculous gift of divine mercy.

The contrast between a pagan and a Christian understanding of sin calls for further examination. At this point in the *Sickness Unto Death,* Kierkegaard once more appeals to Socrates, as he does in the *Fragments* and the *Postscript,* in describing the highest achievement of pagan understanding. Socrates maintained that sin is ignorance. But the question arises, concerning this definition, whether a man is conscious of what he is doing when he begins to obscure his intelligence. If not, then his intelligence was already somewhat obscured. If so, then sin lies not in the intelligence but in the will. Thus Socrates does not really enter into an investigation of the *prius* of sin as Christianity does, with its doctrine of original sin.

If sin is ignorance, then sin does not exist in the strict sense which involves consciousness of it. From the Christian standpoint, Socrates' definitions are just what they should be; for Christianity recognizes that paganism has no room for a genuine category of sin, and distinguishes itself from paganism by having one.

Socrates overlooks the defiant will, the ability knowingly to do evil. Today people know all about the Christian view of sin so far as conceptual understanding goes, but they fail to grasp it existentially. Similarly, a man can say words which show that he has a conceptual understanding of sacrifice, mercy, and generosity; but in the next moment, when he acts, one sees that he does not embody them. He so understands that he can say the right thing, but he so misunderstands that he does the wrong thing. Today the world needs a Socrates to pierce these pretensions, for he, at least, saw that when one fails to do right one has not understood aright; but Socrates' definition cannot make the transition from understanding something to doing it. And when modern speculation (especially Hegel) tries to make the same transition by logical necessity, in complete abstraction from the existing individual, it is simply reverting to paganism. This would not be so bad if it did not at the same time claim to be Christian.

Christianity gives an account of how the evil will perverts the intelligence. This account is not a description of the temporal beginnings of sin; it is rather a description of the spiritual ground in human nature from which all individual beginnings in sin proceed. When the will first confronts a discrepancy between understanding and act, it temporizes. This in itself obscures the intelligence and is the beginning of the triumph of the lower nature; for the good must be done at once, moment by moment. At length the intelligence becomes so darkened that it agrees with the will entirely; and then one's aesthetic and metaphysical understanding—no matter how refined and extensive—is just a bit of ventriloquism in which the intellect expresses what the evil will demands.

Hence Christianity is right in holding that the will must be changed by God's initiative before sin can be "understood." When a man is *in* sin, all his talk about it is at bottom an excuse, a nervous attempt to justify himself without changing himself. For Christianity sin consists not in the fact that man *does* not understand aright, but in the fact that man *will* not understand and do aright. Socrates fails to make this distinction between being able and being willing to understand. The pagan assumes that he can know, by purely human standards, how far he falls from perfection. The Christian knows that God's self-revelation alone can disclose the depth of human shortcoming.

Pantheism makes sin something negative—a lack which manifests it-

self in weakness, finiteness, and ignorance. Christianity knows that sin is something positive, namely, active rebellion; but one can give verbal assent to this conception of sin without grasping it existentially. Indeed, neither sin nor atonement can be conceptually understood; here the only alternative is between believing and being offended; and the paradoxical character of Christianity comes out most acutely in the fact that so far as human resources go sin is insurmountable, but in Christ sin has been utterly overcome. Speculation can never take sin so seriously and can never reach a position where its removal is so complete.

But if only a genuine Christian (who is rare) really is conscious of sin, then is not sin (in the strict sense) rare instead of universal? Yes, in one sense, the lives of most men are too spiritless, and their despair is too superficial to be called "sinful." Yet it is an indictment for what passes as Christianity that real consciousness of sin is rare today.

Most people have no conception of sin's totalitarian character; their daily condition of "being in sin" is so little noticed that it has come to be regarded as normal. Only strikingly bad deeds are counted as new sins, and the rest of the time they assume that everything is going moderately well. Yet it is remaining in the state of sin which is decisive. Each particular sin is merely a manifestation of the state. One must think here in terms of a consistent condition of the whole character. The believer and the demoniac have achieved opposite kinds of consistency. The former brings to every specific temptation a totality of character which he would lose if he succumbed. The latter also has a totality of character which he would lose if he weakened for so much as a moment and give in to the sublimity of goodness. Thus sin can form a consistent and inwardly cohesive structure, so that if anything redemptive breaks through the man falls to pieces. Despair over sin is the final barricade against all hearkening to grace; obdurate refusal to repent is the sinner's last attempt to hold himself together.

However, despair over sin is not averse to decking itself out in the appearance of something good. Much ostensible penitence is bogus; it is a covert way of asserting one's virtue instead of expressing genuine contrition. Self-castigation is a way of maintaining the illusion that, after all, one has a deeply sensitive conscience. Actually to declare "I can never forgive myself for that" is unchristian; for God forgives, and real penitents will pray for that forgiveness.

Face to face with Christ, the despairing person either from weakness does not dare believe in forgiveness, or from defiance will not believe in it. Thus Christ's forgiveness converts the two fundamental forms of despair into their opposites; for before Christ the defiant man *wills* not to be the self he really is—that is, a sinner; he wants to dispense with forgiveness. And the weak man despairingly wills to be the sinner he is, in such a way that there is no forgiveness.

In Christ, God is man's goal and measure, and the self judged by these is vastly intensified in every respect. Hence despair acquires its deepest expression when it is man's response to God's offer of forgiveness; such a man is nearer to God and farther away from Him than any other. Thus, in a sense, Christianity makes possible the most extreme form of sin, namely, to be offended at God's love. But conventional Christianity is so backward that this situation is not even manifest; it takes God's love for granted.

The root of the trouble is that the doctrine of the God-Man has been taken in vain. The qualitative distinction between God and man has been pantheistically abolished in both philosophical and popular thinking. In the Incarnation, God and man are brought together as nowhere else, and God alone could actually bring this about; unless the doctrine points to God's act it is merely a figment of human imagination. But, in its message of forgiveness, Christianity has carefully guarded against any conception of general divine-human coalescence. In forgiveness, God grants, man needs; here there can be no coalescence.

Once the uniqueness of the concrete individual is forgotten, men begin to think of themselves in collective terms; and then an abstraction—Humanity, or the State—comes to be regarded as God. Undeniably, the Christian doctrine of the God-Man has opened the way to the confusion that "man is God." It is as though the confusion were God's fault for coming into human history instead of maintaining His aloofness. But Christianity has safeguarded against deifying humanity or the state; its doctrine of sin pertains to the individual. So far as concepts go, one can only deal with "man," not with the unique individual; hence the individual existing in his sin cannot be dealt with by means of concepts, and there can be no seriousness about sin when it is merely thought about. But before God in Christ only individual men exist. The doctrine of sin fixes the qualitative distinction between God and man absolutely. Sin is predicated of every individual man; it cannot

in any way be predicated of God; even to say, following the *via negationis,* that God is "not a sinner" is blasphemy. And even forgiveness does not destroy the distinction by bestowing divine attributes on man.

The culminating point in sin comes when it goes over to the offensive and declares Christianity to be falsehood. The one thing which Christ cannot remove is the possibility that men will be offended at Him. He cannot remove the possibility that His work of love may turn out to be for a person the exact opposite—extremest misery.

He who is not offended worships in faith; but worship remains aware of the infinite qualitative difference between God and man, and it does not try to grasp by rational comprehension what can only be received as a bestowal from God.

A Short Life of Kierkegaard can be recommended as the natural starting point for any study of his writings. A considerable proportion of Dr. Lowrie's long biography of Kierkegaard consisted of direct quotations from the works of the Danish author. This was extremely desirable at the time because hardly any of his writings had yet been translated into English. Now Dr. Lowrie has taken the trouble to write afresh, instead of merely condensing his longer volume and deleting quotations.

Both biographies will continue to serve distinct functions. Naturally the longer one gives a far more adequate account of the psychological and spiritual conditions lying behind the various phases of Kierkegaard's activities as an author. In this respect it will continue to be indispensable, because the prefaces which have been supplied with each successive volume of translations cannot describe the total setting as well as a continuous account. On the other hand, the short biography now makes the relevant facts about Kierkegaard's life accessible with far less expenditure of the reader's time and money.

David E. Roberts

Union Theological Seminary
New York City

Paths of Life. By Charles Morris. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. 257 pp. $3.00.

Nobody can possibly do justice to this book by starting at the beginning, reading halfway through and then leaving it, because some of

the most impressive ideas appear in its appendix, the thirty-five pages of poetry, which may be regarded as a kind of hymnal for the new world-religion of Maitreyanism to which Dr. Morris is looking forward. Only a few reviewers have paid any attention to this closing part, while, as a matter of fact, we should welcome the opportunity which the author gives us here to read his mind more intimately than that can be done from merely theoretical expositions. These hymns frankly reveal the personal feelings of the author, which in most books by contemporary philosophers remain undisclosed and unattainable behind a screen of generalizing systematic thought. Besides which, the second part of the book displays the author's ideal, which is splendid, while the first half merely builds up his language, which is debatable.

The subtitle of the book, *Preface to a World Religion,* does not imply that Dr. Morris assumes the role of a founder; it is merely a desirous prediction, but it makes us wonder how many people will agree with his definition of religion on page 3: The "quest for an orientation of the total personality is the religious quest," which is another proof for the general impression one gains that he is concerned merely with the cultural and psychological aspects of religion, but not about religion itself. The book is written with a bias which is clearly stated on page 8: "We write the apologetics of Maitreyan men." The audience which Morris is addressing consists of the men and women who "cannot go home again" (p. 9).

Such men are characterized as "Wonderers at our own wonderings," endowed with a love that is like "the gardener's delight in the tree," yet struggling and peaceless, as they are described in one of the hymns, "Possession":

> The song haunts this night.
> Song of the World-Juggernaut.
> Song of the red reaper and the new birth.
> Song of affirmation in the furnace of annihilation.
>
> It is a sad song, a proud song, a maddening song.
> There is no peace for those who have heard it.
> There is no peace for those who have not heard it.

Dr. Morris sees Thomas Mann as a prototype of such an attitude and his *Magic Mountain* as a "vivid dramatization of contemporary man's

search for a way of life" (p. 205). Man alone can work out the answer without waiting for any grace:

> The trap of existence can only be sprung from within.
> Men before have set the limits of their last retreat.

We are today rapidly assimilating psychological patterns by which we constantly try to rethink the world and history. Some of these patterns are extremely rich as, for instance, the astrological symbol-language; some are poor, as is the way of looking at all people as either introverts or extraverts. Morris presents a new pattern, thus answering our needs of today. In a chapter entitled, "The Living God," (which is not theological at all), he gives us an outline of history seen as a cycle of predominance of one of seven types of life at any given time. These ways of life are based on three main psychological types: the Dionysian, the Promethean, and the Buddhist man. The Dionysian man within Morris sings, "I am jealous, envious, hateful of all that escapes my embrace. . . . Of the thoughts I shall never think" (p. 230). The consistent Dionysian attempts to enlarge his attachment to embrace everything whatsoever (p. 52). Nietzsche is quoted in his own words as "the last disciple and initiate of the god Dionysus."

The Bible of Prometheanism, on the other hand, is Goethe's *Faust,* showing the continuous urge to reconstruct the world. For today John Dewey is quoted as the clearest philosophic voice of Prometheus, and America as the scene of his culmination. The whole Western culture has been and still is predominantly Prometheus' world; his burden has been a heavy one, but his forces are still not spent (p. 112).

The ascetic principle, however, is also at work everywhere; its deep roots can be seen in the fact that the self becomes more manageable as it is simplified (p. 56). Thus the Buddhist path of detachment from desire is the third main component of most men's characters.

Morris formulates first what he means by the Buddhist, Dionysian, Promethean, Christian, Apollonian, and Mohammedan types of man, and secondly, in his further investigation, finds that these particular traits are invariably insufficiently presented within the history of the religions that bear these names. Historical reality shows everywhere a confusion of a number of these ideals. Thus there appears to be a rather unfortunate confusion in Morris' own calling of ideas and his-

torical realities by the same name. Of course, most speculative philosophers do things like that, and we might be inclined to blame Morris less than the average author of books in this line, because he, at least, proceeds consciously and seems to know what he is achieving and also what he is missing.

He gives a very good account of the main trends of Buddhist historical development, but the well-chosen quotations from Buddhist texts are unfortunately always given without reference. Some points will become clearer through quotations: "The Christian and Buddhist are both predominantly buddhistic" (p. 30). "The changes of attitude represented in the bodhisattva ideal and in the affiliations with Tantrism are attempts by persons higher in promethean and dionysian traits to modify Buddhism in a direction more congenial to their natures" (p. 51). Morris believes that the world today has much to learn from Buddhistic detachment, and that even a revived Buddhism should profit by the history of Buddhism and should align itself deliberately with the scientific attitude.

Aristotle's writings are taken as the Canon of the Apollonian personality, the temperament of which has found expression in various cultures, particularly in the cult of Vishnu, in Confucianism, and confusedly in "Aquinas' Aristotelianized version of Christianity."

The characterization of the Christian personality is the weakest part of the whole system.

Finally, in Mohammedanism we find the personality of the prophet projected into Allah: "Hitler cristallized the whole movement in a deed; the parallel to Mohammed is complete almost to the smallest detail, *Mein Kampf* is a modern Koran" (p. 145).

We reach the heart of the whole affair (pp. 153-64) when we come to the exposition of the Maitreyan man and his attitude of generalized detached-attachment. "To other types of persons the Maitreyan will seem no distinctive type: they will regard him as trying to be all—and becoming nothing." The West will find him too oriental and the Orient too occidental. His own doubts will beset him from within. The United States is the land that will assume the historic task of giving him "social habitation." Morris says in his hymn, "America": "There is no mold out of which you are being poured, beloved Land." The characteristics of "the new guardians," the "signs of the new integrity," are simplicity, discipline, forthrightness, companionship, openness, flexibility, bold-

ness, sportsmanship (p. 229). But the Maitreyan man has not yet appeared. We are reminded of Rainer Maria Rilke when Morris says (p. 205), "For the sake of our togetherness it is well that we cannot meet." In his "Salutation" he welcomes the coming of the new man thus:

> Unknown Friend!
> We shall not see each other.
> Our hands will not meet.
> Our eyes will not share their depths.
> The Word will not be spoken between us.

A new god is struggling for birth! One might more easily subscribe to this idea if one could accept Morris' definition of God as "the key symbol which men have used to express the preferred type of personality to which their own orientation tends" (p. 185).

As a tool convenient for his purposes, Morris has created in this book a new language almost in *chiffres,* sometimes reminding one of mathematical calculations, as logicians have done now and then. This historico-psychological sign-language enables him to express himself on a number of problems advantageously, while, on the other hand, this very language creates by its own logic new problems. But perhaps the book should be enjoyed as a work of art, rather than criticized as a system of philosophy and, as it is pointedly an invocation to gods and men of tomorrow, perhaps we lack the standards for judging it authoritatively.

FREDERIC SPIEGELBERG

Pacific School of Religion

BOOK NOTES

The Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon. Part IV. (*Sacred Books of the Buddhists,* Vol. X.) Edited with Introduction by MRS. RHYS DAVIDS. London. Luzac and Co., 1942. xviii + 250 pp. Paper, 8*s*; cloth, 10*s* 6*d*.

The minor literature of a great religion never has quite the same type of interest as its major classics. Yet, for those knowing its classics, it is always instructive to observe what values survive on its more uninspired levels. The *Pali Vimāna Vatthu* and the *Peta Vatthu,* here respectively translated as "Stories of the Mansions" and "Stories of the Departed," is just this sort of lesser literature. Their inclusion in the *Sacred Books of the East* series is explained by the editor in her Introduction. In the first place, they actually belonged to the Pali canon at the time of its compilation, and, in the second place, they "aid the general reader of other canonical scriptures to complete his picture of more or less early Buddhist values which they suggest" (p. v).

"Stories of the Mansions," translated chiefly by Jean Kennedy and in part by the editor, consists of eighty poems, each accompanied by prose story and commentary. One basic motif runs throughout. A beautiful mansion in the after-life is enjoyed by some radiant being. A saintly personage, usually Moggallāna, though on occasion some other disciple or even Gotama himself, asks the happy one what good deeds done in the previous existence has merited such reward. The reply is an account of the specific pious or charitable acts which have led to this splendid dwelling. It is a simple didactic device, capable of endless variation, both in regard to the virtues praised and the rewards obtained. Description of mansions hereafter furnishes scope to the Indian love of gorgeous imagery. Ethics of kindliness, liberality in alms-giving, and the orthodox abstentions—from taking life, false speaking, theft, sex transgression, and drinking of liquor—are exalted. Reiteration inculcates the moral: good deeds here bring celestial rewards hereafter. More complex concepts, such as the impermanence and misery of transmigratory existence and final release in *nīrvaṇa,* are conspicuously absent. Attention is wholly concentrated on the reward side of the doctrine of retribution (i.e., *karma*).

The reverse side of the doctrine appears in the "Stories of the Departed," of which Professor Henry S. Gehman, of Princeton Theological Seminary, is the translator. In the poems with their accompanying "frame stories" the same pedagogical device as in the "Mansions" is followed, with one change. The spirit whose condition is inquired into, appears here as a suffering ghost *(peta),* who explains by what evil deeds he merited his present ill rebirth. A complication, however, destroys the complete antithesis. The interrogator, usually some pitying saint or monk, not infrequently has some of his own merit transferred to the sufferer. Through such supererogation the *peta* shortly finds release from suffering and rebirth in heaven. As Dr. Gehman points out, this is "a serious blemish in the working out of the law of cause and effect." It is also evidence of a later, lower level of Hīnayāna thought.

In spite of the relatively jejune character of their subject matter, both trans-

lators and editor have bestowed faithful, scientific labor on the rendition of these books into English. Indeed, their labor has been greater than immediately appears. Practical considerations, due to war circumstances in England, ultimately necessitated the elimination of much commentarial detail and many informative footnotes originally in the manuscripts of the translators.

In the end, the gainer is the general reader. With this volume in hand he can easily discern the character of the minor literature in its essentials. He can also catch the feel of the common popular piety which has, no doubt, motivated many more Buddhists of Southern Asia than have the original insights of the founder of the faith.

CLARENCE H. HAMILTON

The Role of Conjuring in Saulteaux Society. By A. IRVING HALLOWELL. (Publications of the Philadelphia Anthropological Society, Vol. II.) Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania Press, 1942. xiv + 96 pp. $1.25.

This account of conjuring in an Algonkin group living east of Lake Winnipeg, by one who has made a specialty of the region and of psychological phases of Algonkin cultures, is a welcome addition to our ethnographic knowledge. The Saulteaux conjurer is a visionary rather than the medium of a spirit, and talks in tones not his own. He sees and hears over great distances. Dreams make revelations to him. The conjuring lodge is illustrated and described, and there are circumstantial descriptions of performances. The author has utilized the relevant literature that describes conjuring in other central Algonkin groups. A concluding section describes the social functions of conjuring.

WILSON D. WALLIS

The Cambridge Senior Bible. Cambridge: at the University Press. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1942. xii + 325 pp. $1.25.

The Cambridge Senior Bible is a new printing of selections from the Old and New Testaments in the English revision of the King James text. The selections have been made by a committee of distinguished educators drawn from the faculties of the colleges in Cambridge University and from the public schools in Cambridgeshire. The purpose of the volume is to provide in a convenient form the selections from the Bible on which are based the lessons in the Cambridgehire Syllabus of Religious Teaching for Schools, a syllabus already in use in the Cambridgeshire schools and churches. Its content has thus been determined in advance by this lesson syllabus, and its distinctive character lies, therefore, not so much in what it selects to print as in how it interprets these selections through their grouping and through the title headings chosen for them.

In the Old Testament part of the volume, the titles are for the most part historical, such as "The Exodus," "The Conflict with the Canaanites," "The

Monarchy," 'Crisis and Exile," etc. By their insertion into this historical scheme, the selections from the Prophets have been given historical perspective, and the Book of Ruth finds its rightful place following the selection from Ezra that has to do with the post-exile opposition to foreign marriages. The Book of Jonah is also placed in the Persian period, and a footnote explains its purpose as a defense of the inclusion of the Gentiles within the religion of the Jews.

Perhaps the point at which the limitations of so small a volume appear most strikingly is in connection with the Psalms. Where only seventeen can be chosen from a treasury of one hundred and fifty it is inevitable that the favorites of many individual readers have been omitted. It is one of the strengths of the collection that it includes in the Greek period, under the caption of "The Spirit of the Greeks," not only selections from the canonical Wisdom books, but also some very beautiful passages from the Apocryphal books, Tobit, Wisdom, and Ecclesiasticus.

The difficulties of making this kind of selection from the New Testament are very great. The editors proceeded on the plan of harmonizing the Gospel materials to make a chronology of Jesus' life. The Fourth Gospel has been assimilated to the Synoptic order, and its narratives are treated as being on the same footing as the Synoptic stories. It may be that this plan will present no difficulties as the book is used in connection with the previously prepared lesson Syllabus. But modern research in the New Testament field tends to argue against assuming a known chronology for the events narrated in the Gospels. This research also leads the student in the direction of seeking to discover the trends of interpretation within the Gospels themselves. Such a harmonistic arrangement of the gospel materials as the Senior Bible gives leads in the opposite direction.

The remaining selections from the New Testament have been grouped as narratives telling of the beginnings of the Church, the break with Judaism, and the life of Paul, and as the preaching of the Church. Here, under this final caption, "The Apostolic Preaching," are grouped selections from the letters of Paul and the General Epistles. Here also is placed the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel and some selections from its discourse material, as well as some portions of the Book of Revelation. In this final section the captions for the separate sections are especially helpful. They are truly interpretive, and they help the reader to feel the range and variety and beauty of the New Testament's presentation of Christian experience. But should not the Book of Revelation have had a special notation to indicate that it is an apocalypse rather than true preaching?

The editors expressed in the Preface their hope that this volume might prove helpful to general readers, as well as to those who are using the Syllabus. The present reviewer believes that it merits a wide use in America as well as in England.

MARY ELY LYMAN

Chiasmus in the New Testament: A Study in Formgeschichte. By Nils Wilhelm Lund. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1942. xiv + 428 pp. $4.00.

Chiasmus as a literary pattern needs no introduction to classical scholars nor to students of Old Testament poetry. Much of the literary style of the Bible, that is, of the various writers, involves, even in non-poetic passages, this type of inversion. The simplest kind is to be seen in the saying in Mark 2:27:

> The Sabbath/was made for man,
> And not man/for the Sabbath.

Here the second half of line one and the first half of line two are parallel; the second half of line two repeats the first half of line one. A longer illustration is found in Matthew 7:6:

> Give not that which is holy unto the *dogs,*
> Neither cast your pearls before the *swine,*
> Lest haply they (the swine) *trample* them under their feet,
> And they (the dogs) turn and *rend* you.

Still another is the passage from St. Augustine on the Psalms:

> Ibi est *aurum,*
> Ibi est *palea,*
> Ibi *ignis* in angusto operatur.
> *Ignis* ille non est diversus, et diversa agit,
> *Paleam* in cinerem vertit,
> *Auro* sordes tollit.

What is new in Dr. Lund's thorough treatise is, first of all, its comprehensive character. It surely includes everything in the way of chiastic arrangement to be found in the law, the prophets, or the Psalms of the Old Testament, in the Epistles of Paul (I Corinthians, Ephesians, Colossians, Philippians, Philemon, and Romans), in the discourses in the Gospel of Matthew, and in the Book of Revelation. Furthermore, the author makes this "a study in Formgeschichte." He even undertakes to apply the chiastic structure of passages to their interpretation, for example, in I Cor. 7:36-39, one of the most difficult passages in the New Testament. Form history is certainly involved in chiasmus. When one considers the number of popular poems, folk-songs, not to say nursery rhymes, which are chiastic in structure, it must be obvious that chiasmus results from a natural linking and repetition of ideas in the interest of easier memorization.

One great value in Dr. Lund's book is its comprehensiveness. No one has ever expounded the theory in more detail or given it a broader application, or has gathered together such a wealth of examples from the Bible. It may be that his examples are too numerous. Further research may reduce the number of chiastic passages. But it is all to the good that we have the theory stated as fully

as possible in a work which, in our day, represents a great pioneering enterprise.

The book also contains a useful, though very diversified, bibliography, not only of chiasmus but also of biblical literature in general where further material upon the subject may be found.

FREDERICK C. GRANT

Saints and Sinners in Old Romance: Poems of Feudal France and England. Translated by CHARLES MAXWELL LANCASTER. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1942. XXVIII + 438 pp. $3.00.

A group of popular medieval ballads telling the stories of saints, martyrs and hermits comprises the first half of this collection. In their naïve love of wonders and their delight in the details of cruel austerities and torture, these tales present a vivid picture of the folk aspect of the religion of the Middle Ages. In the second part of the collection are found the stories of luckless and sinful lovers whose passionate devotion represents the reverse side of the ascetic ideal. One might, without too much exaggeration, call these popular ballads the "pulps" of their day, for they cater to the same psychological demands.

M. B.

Religion in Colonial America. By WILLIAM WARREN SWEET. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942. xiii + 367 pp. $3.00.

This is the first volume of a projected series of three to provide for the first time a comprehensive and critical church history of America, which is an important and welcome enterprise. Professor Sweet brings to it a wide reading and thorough familiarity with the materials and methods of up-to-date history. The Preface announces that "this volume is to place religion in its proper perspective in American colonial history." This ambitious aim it can scarcely be said to realize, for on the whole it is simply good church history, treating organized religion as a subject by itself and making little attempt to "place religion" in the perspectives of American culture or of other institutions—save in one significant respect. The volume closes with a survey and interpretation of the growth of religious liberty in America, and of the separation of church and state as the culmination of this growth. In fact, throughout this history Professor Sweet gives emphasis to dissent, especially of the Baptist and Quaker types, which present the extreme individualistic conception of religion, and he represents the characteristic American development as the growth of free and popular religion. There is enough truth in this thesis to make it tenable, but it is certainly not the whole story. And it is somewhat dubious when put in the following form: "In the seventeenth century there was little in the way of religion that could be called distinctively American; in the eighteenth century America began to turn its back more and more upon European influence, with the result that a distinctively American religious scene began to appear (pp. vii-

viii). Professor Sweet represents the Great Awakening as the culmination of the typically American "democratization" of religion.

This volume is significantly an attempt to get away from a purely denominational church history. The first and last two chapters particularly discuss such general themes as missionary motives, tolerance, revivals; and though the other chapters follow the conventional denominational patterns, there is a persistent attempt in each to emphasize interdenominational relations. On the whole, however, the book illustrates the fact that anyone who writes church history is doomed to write the histories of particular churches. In this respect Professor Sweet makes a serious effort to do more justice to the history of Roman Catholicism in America than is customary in non-sectarian histories, but his section on this subject is still inadequate, and through no fault of his, since the critical research in this field is still meager.

To my mind the most interesting reading and the most original expositions are contained in the two chapters, "Trade and Religion in New Netherland" and "The Presbyterian Irish." The way religion fits into the economic and political affairs of the Dutch and the Scotch-Irish is important material for general American history, and too much neglected. In these chapters, too, Professor Sweet's judicious use of recent historical research is evident. In general the bibliographical references are exceptionally useful because the references to specific contributions are embodied in the exposition where they are relevant. We await eagerly the other volumes.

H. W. S.

The Attitude of the Northern Clergy toward the South, 1860-1865. By CHESTER FORRESTER DUNHAM. Toledo, Ohio: The Gray Publishing Company, 1942. xi + 258 pp. $3.50.

More than a hundred and eighty ministers, from New England to Iowa, are here quoted, and more than forty-five periodicals. It was wise to include in the material editorials and articles, because these proceeded from ministers, and when the religious press was more of a power than now they had wide reading and influence. This basis for the inquiry is small, only a "sample," as the author says. Yet he has given a broader presentation of ministerial opinion concerning slavery and the war than we have had hitherto. He draws almost entirely on "Baptist, Congregational, Methodist Episcopal, Presbyterian, Unitarian and Universalist" sources. The Roman Catholic, Protestant Episcopal, and Lutheran churches did not express themselves officially regarding slavery, and the first two of these three took no stand concerning the war, while the Lutheran church upheld the government once it had entered the conflict. The churches of the other group "provided the Northern Clergy, who were the leaders of the anti-slavery movement, the supporters of war, and the adherents of a dynamic policy of reconstruction."

The book begins with affairs of the 1850's. Opposition to slavery among the clergy was much strengthened by the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 and grew

through the decade. As secession began to threaten, Northern ministers to a considerable number favored a peaceable separation, which would free the North from slavery. But when it came, most of them advocated the preservation of the Union, by force if necessary. The chapter on "The Southern Way of Life" shows how in pulpits and religious periodicals, as the war came on, "Southern civilization with its political oligarchy, its social aristocracy, its class legislation, its limited educational opportunities, and its spirit of superiority, coercion and intolerance" was held up against "Northern civilization" as something opposite at every point.

The chapter strangely entitled, "The Holy Crusade of the Southland," exhibits with many examples the fervent support of the war given by "most Northern ministers, . . . the vast number." Mr. Dunham reports what has been observed before, a shift in "emphasis on war aims, from the preservation of the Union to the overthrow of slavery," obvious from the Emancipation Proclamation. One of the several questions which he asks and does not answer is, "how did the clergy reconcile these militant beliefs with the Christian gospel?" His own quotations show that the great majority of ministers knew no such hesitations. The two aims of the war made it for them a war in a good cause, worthy to be waged by Christians. Little pacifism of the modern kind is recorded, except among Quakers. Some neutrality there was among ministers, caused by the pressure of business interests and Southern sympathies. But the general attitude was a determined upholding of the war as a Christian duty. Through Mr. Dunham's account of this runs a note of faint sneering, in the manner of some contemporary pacifists, unjust to honest men preaching according to their convictions in their nation's agony.

"War Guilt and Peace Terms" contains mostly utterances of ministers concerning the assassination of Lincoln, which forced the question of how the South should be treated. On the whole these were less vengeful than editorials of secular newspapers. The ministerial judgment was "in general, a pardon for the masses, and for the leaders a stern sentence of death, or exile, or confiscation of property, or deprivation of citizenship." "Architects of the New South" describes large plans for religious and educational service, mostly stated in 1865. Though somewhat touched with superiority and hostility, these designs shine by comparison with the spirit of reconstruction.

Regarding these last two subjects and "The Southern Way of Life," what the author presents has considerable novelty. On the general attitude of the great majority of Northern ministers his account is in substance what is known, but his abundant documentation contributes vividness and understanding. Unfortunately, he attempts to relieve a somewhat banal style by what he evidently considers picturesque writing, for example, "ostrich-like sidestepping the question,"—"scalding, scathing and seething attack,"—"between a glacier of pacifism and a cauldron of patriotism." Another question which he raises and does not answer, a question of prime importance, is whether the ministers formed public opinion or reflected it. He appears to incline toward the former view, for

he says that "the Northern clergy were an outstanding articulate force in the public life of the United States." Certainly true, this is the justification of his book.

ROBERT HASTINGS NICHOLS

Christian Europe Today. By ADOLPH KELLER. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1942. x + 310 pp. $3.00.

This is a comprehensive book written by one eminently fitted to give us a factual report and a theological interpretation of the status of Christianity in the Europe of today. The substance of the book was originally given in the form of the Lowell Lectures at Boston, the Moore Lectures at the San Francisco Theological Seminary, and the Carew Lectures at Hartford Theological Seminary.

This is a "dark book" growing out of the bleak background of Europe, which is no longer static, but in constant flux. For this reason the book contains no systematic or complete description of a stable situation. Everything anyone says about Christian Europe now is of a fragmentary character and must be presented with humility. History in the making is enigmatical, and in Europe dark and demonic forces are at work giving a tragic hue to the contemporary scene. This book is interpretative historiography, in which the author is constantly seeking to find theological meaning in Europe's catastrophe.

Many facts are here presented to reveal the status of Christianity in every section of Europe, in Russia, Austria, Bohemia, Poland, Norway, Denmark, Posen, Holland, Belgium, Spain, France, the Baltic countries, and Germany. Few realize what has happened to the Baltic Churches as well as those in Soviet-occupied Poland under communist domination.

The story of the German Church conflict is briefly and clearly told. How much religious liberty Article 124 of the Bolshevist constitution really offers is a serious question. Religious liberty has all but disappeared in Spain, where only two evangelical congregations remain open, and the theological school is closed. The Bible Society and the Protestant press are forbidden. While it is difficult to determine how far the Roman Church is involved in the persecution of Protestantism in Spain, and elsewhere, yet the Roman Church is also suffering greatly in the European cauldron. Dr. Keller also writes on the spiritual problem of daily bread (hunger), and the "caravan of despair" (refugees).

In Part IV the Church is described as the body of Christ hanging on the Cross, wounded and bleeding. Yet, she is giving her faithful witness. The Bible is being recovered, and theology has once again become an "arsenal." Many personal accounts are presented concerning "The Clandestine Church," "The Church in the Camps," "Struggling Youth," "Inner Resistance," and "The Battle of Love" (charity).

This interesting and moving book closes with a section devoted to reconstruction. The Church insists upon repentance and orientation towards God as essential for general reconstruction. In her recent discussions, the Church's

message has also insisted on liberty, justice, and the fellowship of nations. This message must become a veritable "tempest" through the influence of Christian laymen who have the courage to witness in social affairs.

Towards the New Order, European, British and American Churches have contributions to make. Europe will be a vast missions field requiring re-education, a new evangelism, a healing ministry, and an adequate theological leadership. Dr. Keller discusses the relation between American, British, and Continental Protestantism, and gives an interesting view of the relation between these and Roman and Orthodox Catholicism. And throughout these chapters the growth, status, importance, and difficulties of the ecumenical movement are discussed. In this terrible conflict, a churchless Christianity of vague mysticism, as well as religious indifference and nihilism, represent a "religious no-man's land."

There are comments one would like to make about many subjects presented in this book. It is a vast book, filled with first-hand information, theological discussions, and historical interpretations. But above all, the book is a proclamation of faith in Jesus Christ and His Church! It is "five minutes past twelve," the times are dark, and God asks us to walk through the shadows. Our final reliance is upon Him, of Whom Luther (and later the Stockholm Conference) sang, "A Mighty Fortress Is Our God." Victory is with God!

Those who wish to possess the best and most comprehensive book on the subject of present-day European Christianity should procure this book and let its story give them a deeper insight into their Christian faith and its place, and plight, and promise in the present situation.

E. G. Homrighausen

The Catholic Pattern. By Thomas F. Woodlock. New York: Simon and Schuster, Inc., 1942. xxii + 201 pp. $2.00.

The author is a retired newspaperman and journalist of long experience, a man of important business connections, and a layman holding honorary degrees from Catholic schools. The book is a fresh and breezy testimony of the Catholic faith. One feels the genuineness of the author's faith in the frankness of the discussion, particularly of the criticisms leveled against Roman Catholicism by non-Catholics, by a vocabulary which supercedes conventional theological expressions, and by the conspicuous absence of the usual mark of imprimatur. The term "pattern" is a happy one. It is the general outlook upon life, including one's estimate of man, his purpose in life, the good life, God and human hopes. At home in Catholic theology, the author sets forth its doctrines in a way that is unusually palatable, particularly to non-metaphysically minded readers. There are discussions in brief chapters of the church, the pilgrimage as represented by the seven sacraments, popes and priestly functions, and the whole program of salvation in terms of a revealed yet rational religion. The opening exposition lays out the Catholic pattern, and the concluding part appraises modern trends in terms of this pattern. Papal pronouncements are shown to be sound as

well as the whole Catholic view of life. Our modern "mess" is not only social and political, but it shows itself in the dance, novels, painting, manners, moral laxities, doctrinal indifference, scientific dogmatisms, and secularism in general. The particular indictments against our age are considered under the general heading of three great apostosies: those in religion, in philosophy, and in morals.

Catholic laymen will welcome a book of this kind as a usable apologetic. Catholic priests ought to bless it. Non-Catholics will find their estimate of the Catholic faith greatly elevated.

VERGILIUS FERM

Your Morale and How To Build It. By AUSTIN PARDUE. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942. 132 pp. $1.50.

The burden of Tolstoi's argument in his great novel, *War and Peace,* is that manpower, artillery, and the grand strategy of the general staff are not the decisive factors in war. More determinative in the final issue of victory are the thousand and one unforeseen and unpredictable accidents which arise in the day of battle, and the courage and resolve of the common soldier and of the people behind him. Beyond the arena of physical conflict, modern war extends into the world of men's thought and emotion. The psychological resources of a people have come to be quite as formidable an element as their physical resources. The Dean of St. Paul's (Episcopal) Cathedral in Buffalo has addressed his present book to the fortification of these inner resources.

A brief review of Dean Pardue's ten rules for living in war time will give a fair estimate of his outlook, though it will do scant justice to the wealth of illustration which the author himself uses to reinforce his points. The Dean has not neglected the obvious in his rules for living: basic to morale are such simple matters as (1) exercise, (2) good literature, (3) thrift, and (4) cheerfulness. On the next level, he sets (5) the use of silence and (6) courage. In order follow (7) a spirit of unity which will not yield to the temptation of easy but unfair criticism of others, and (8) a faith in the rightness of our cause and dedication thereto. In the uppermost story, Dr. Pardue sets (9) control over our thoughts, the eradication of those thieves of our tranquillity, Hate, Fear, Pride, Selfishness, etc., which can be defeated only by (10) prayer.

Perhaps such an analysis of our needs will seem oversimple. This reviewer looked in vain for any really penetrating analysis of the current situation. The "strong meat" promised on the jacket of the book seemed to consist in the author's pointing out some unpleasant, but perfectly obvious, truths about our attitudes and behavior during the years of war before our entrance. But the writer's purpose was to give help to the morale of the average listener to the radio, and on that score the book should be of considerable use and value.

GEORGE E. RATH

AMONG THE PERIODICALS

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